

***AASB EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATORS WORKSHOP***

**NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN ALASKA  
2022**

***Presented by Michael Caulfield  
Jermain Dunnagan & Owens, P.C.***

**AASB EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATORS WORKSHOP**

**NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN ALASKA**

**2022**

*Presented by Michael Caulfield  
Jermain Dunnagan & Owens, P.C.*

New update coming in March/April 2023.

**I. ALASKA LAWS AND REGULATIONS**

**a. Alaska Reads Act (House Bill 114/Senate Bill 111)**

This act seeks to improve student outcomes through several avenues. First, the bill establishes a financial incentive for districts to improve the quality of their early education programs by allowing districts to include students of high-quality early education programs in the foundation formula. The bill also creates a targeted grant program for low-performing districts that need to develop or improve their early education programs.

Next, the act directs the Department of Education and Early Development (DEED) to establish reading screening tools to identify students that are falling behind. The bill then directs school districts to provide intervention services to those students that need it. This “testing with purpose” process, which is also known as the “Read by Nine Program,” will test student reading skills three times a year.

Programs that target students who fall behind would receive state funding, and students may offered “individual reading improvement plans.” Students who are still behind at the end of the year may be held back a grade or be considered for other accommodations. Low performing schools may receive special state staff to help improve performance. These staff would have special training in culturally responsive education. The funding for this program will extend until 2034.

In addition to the above, the act also boosts spending on state sponsored preschool, as well a state-maintained virtual education library.

- Amending and revising numerous sections of Alaska Statute 14.03, .07, .20 and .30.

#### **b. Teacher Certification Reciprocity (Senate Bill 20)**

This act streamlines the process by which out-of-state teachers can gain certification in Alaska, with the goal of making it easier for out-of-state teachers to transfer into Alaska. Specifically, the act allows teachers to transfer their out-of-state certification into Alaska and receive near-automatic certification, provided they hold a baccalaureate degree and subsequently complete Alaska specific training.

- Amending and revising numerous sections of Alaska Statute 14.20.010, 14.20.015, and 14.20.020.

#### **c. Limited Language Immersion Teacher Certificates (House Bill 19)**

This act creates a new type of teacher certificate available for people who are qualified to teach a non-English language but do not otherwise hold the prerequisites for teacher certification. The purpose of the act is primarily to increase the availability of Alaska Native language courses in schools.

- Amending Alaska Statute 14.20.023.

#### **d. Military Children School Residency Waiver (House Bill 53)**

This act allows military children with residency outside of the state, but with documentation of a pending military relocation to the state, access to preliminary registration, enrollment, or application to a school district at the time that the process is open to the general student population. Proof of residency is temporarily waived until the student begins school. Once the student begins school their parent or guardian has ten (10) days to provide proof of residency in the school district.

- Amending Alaska Statute 14.03.080.

#### **e. State-Tribal Education Compact (Senate Bill 34)**

This act directs the Alaska Board of Education and Early Development to negotiate a demonstration state-tribal education compact with federally recognized tribes and tribal organizations in the state to establish demonstration state-tribal education

compact schools. The demonstration state-tribal education compact may be for a term of not more than five years and may not include more than five demonstration state-tribal education compact schools.

This pilot program allows tribes to apply to create their own K-12 curriculum, independent of an existing school district. It is intended to serve as a model for what future tribal education programs could look like in the state.

Not later than January 31, 2024, the board shall submit a report containing recommendations to the legislature relating to the demonstration state-tribal education compact and demonstration state-tribal education compact schools.

- Amending the uncodified law of Alaska.

## **II. FEDERAL LAWS**

### **a. Title IX**

JDO and AASB have developed a Title IX administrative regulation, AR 0410, which establishes standards required by the Department of Education's Title IX revisions. The revisions were promulgated by the Department of Education and went into effect as a final rule in August of 2020.

The revisions to Title IX are expansive. They require school district to create elaborate investigation, hearing, and resolution procedures for complaints that may constitute violations of Title IX. Under Title IX, districts which receive federal funding must respond to sex discrimination, including sexual harassment. Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in a school's activities and programs, and requires all schools, from K-12 to post-secondary institutions, to take appropriate steps to prevent and redress instances of sex discrimination. The AR 0410 prepared by JDO and AASB provides a model policy that districts may use as they establish their own Title IX investigation and resolution procedures.

- Implementing AR 0410.

## **III. EDUCATION LAW IN THE COURTS**

### **a. *Kennedy v. Bremerton School District*, 597 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2022)**

This case involved a high school football coach in Bremerton, Washington who had a practice of holding a public prayer on the field after each game. Players were not required to be participate, but given his role as coach some felt compelled to. The District asked him to stop the prayer to protect itself from a lawsuit on establishment of religion grounds.

The coach refused to stop the prayer, and the school suspended him. He sued, all the way to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held for the coach, finding that in forbidding Mr. Kennedy's prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to his free exercise of religion. The court also found that because he gave the prayers postgame, when players were free to partake in other activities, he was not holding the prayer in his capacity as coach.

This case sets an important precedent going forward regarding the exercise of religion at schools.

## **QUESTIONS?**

**Michael Caulfield**  
**mcaulfield@jdolaw.com**  
**907-563-8844**



# LAWS OF ALASKA

2022

**Source**

SCS HB 114(FIN) am S

**Chapter No.**

\_\_\_\_\_

**AN ACT**

Relating to facilities constituting a school; relating to the powers and duties of the Department of Education and Early Development; relating to public schools and school districts; relating to early education programs; relating to funding for early education programs; relating to school age eligibility; relating to reports by the Department of Education and Early Development; relating to reports by school districts; relating to certification and competency of teachers; relating to screening reading deficiencies and providing reading intervention services to public school students enrolled in grades kindergarten through three; relating to textbooks and materials for reading intervention services; establishing a reading program in the Department of Education and Early Development; relating to the definition of "parent" in education statutes; relating to a virtual education consortium; relating to the education loan program, the Alaska supplemental education loan program, and the teacher education loan program; and providing for an effective date.

\_\_\_\_\_

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

THE ACT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 1



## **AN ACT**

1 Relating to facilities constituting a school; relating to the powers and duties of the Department  
2 of Education and Early Development; relating to public schools and school districts; relating  
3 to early education programs; relating to funding for early education programs; relating to  
4 school age eligibility; relating to reports by the Department of Education and Early  
5 Development; relating to reports by school districts; relating to certification and competency  
6 of teachers; relating to screening reading deficiencies and providing reading intervention  
7 services to public school students enrolled in grades kindergarten through three; relating to  
8 textbooks and materials for reading intervention services; establishing a reading program in  
9 the Department of Education and Early Development; relating to the definition of "parent" in  
10 education statutes; relating to a virtual education consortium; relating to the education loan  
11 program, the Alaska supplemental education loan program, and the teacher education loan



1 program; and providing for an effective date.

2 \_\_\_\_\_  
3 \* **Section 1.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section  
4 to read:

5 SHORT TITLE. This Act may be known as the Alaska Reads Act.

6 \* **Sec. 2.** AS 14.03.040 is amended to read:

7 **Sec. 14.03.040. Day in session.** Each day within the school term is a day in  
8 session except Saturdays, Sundays, and days designated as holidays by or according to  
9 AS 14.03.050. A school board may approve Saturdays as a day in session. The day in  
10 session in every school shall be at least four hours long, exclusive of intermissions, for  
11 the first, second, and third grades and five hours, exclusive of intermissions, for [ALL  
12 OTHER] grades **four through 12**. The commissioner may approve a shorter day in  
13 session for any grade. The period of the day in session shall be devoted to the  
14 instruction of pupils or to study periods for the pupils.

15 \* **Sec. 3.** AS 14.03.060(e) is amended to read:

16 (e) In addition to the grades enumerated in (a) of this section, an elementary  
17 school consists of **an early education** [A PRE-ELEMENTARY] program **approved**  
18 **or** supervised by the department under AS 14.07.020(a)(8), **including a program**  
19 operated by **a head start agency** [THE DEPARTMENT] as a head start program  
20 under **42 U.S.C. 9831 - 9852c** [AS 14.38.010, OR LOCATED IN A PUBLIC  
21 SCHOOL FOR FEDERAL FUNDING PURPOSES. EXCEPT FOR A CHILD WITH  
22 A DISABILITY WHO IS RECEIVING SPECIAL EDUCATION OR RELATED  
23 SERVICES UNDER AS 14.30.180 - 14.30.350, PRE-ELEMENTARY STUDENTS  
24 MAY NOT BE COUNTED IN A SCHOOL'S AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP  
25 UNDER AS 14.17].

26 \* **Sec. 4.** AS 14.03.060(e), as amended by sec. 3 of this Act, is amended to read:

27 (e) In addition to the grades enumerated in (a) of this section, an elementary  
28 school consists of an early education program [APPROVED OR] supervised by the  
29 department under AS 14.07.020(a)(8), including a program operated by a head start  
30 agency as a head start program under 42 U.S.C. 9831 - 9852c.

1     \* **Sec. 5.** AS 14.03.072(a) is amended to read:

2             (a) Each school district shall annually provide to parents and guardians of  
3             students enrolled in kindergarten through grade three in a public school in the state  
4             current information on the importance of [EARLY] literacy **and early reading**,  
5             including

6                     (1) **culturally responsive** intervention strategies **and reading**  
7                     **intervention services provided under AS 14.30.765**;

8                     (2) home **reading** [LITERACY] plans;

9                     (3) grade **progression** [RETENTION] standards and policies for the  
10             elementary school attended;

11                     (4) strategies and resources to help children learn to read;

12                     **(5) a list of resources and organizations that specialize in**  
13                     **improving adult literacy.**

14     \* **Sec. 6.** AS 14.03.072(a), as amended by sec. 5 of this Act, is amended to read:

15             (a) Each school district shall annually provide to parents and guardians of  
16             students enrolled in kindergarten through grade three in a public school in the state  
17             current information on the importance of literacy and early reading, including

18                     (1) culturally responsive intervention strategies [AND READING  
19             INTERVENTION SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER AS 14.30.765];

20                     (2) home reading plans;

21                     (3) grade progression standards and policies for the elementary school  
22             attended;

23                     (4) strategies and resources to help children learn to read;

24                     (5) a list of resources and organizations that specialize in improving  
25             adult literacy.

26     \* **Sec. 7.** AS 14.03.078(a) is amended to read:

27             (a) The department shall provide to the legislature **and school districts** by  
28             February 15 of each year by electronic means an annual report regarding the progress  
29             of each school and school district toward high academic performance by all students.  
30             The report required under this section must include

31                     (1) information described under **AS 14.03.120** [AS 14.03.120(d)];

1 (2) progress of the department  
2 (A) toward implementing the school accountability provisions  
3 of AS 14.03.123; and  
4 (B) in assisting high schools to become accredited;  
5 (3) a description of the resources provided to each school and school  
6 district for coordinated school improvement activities and staff training in each school  
7 and school district;  
8 (4) each school district's and each school's progress in aligning  
9 curriculum with state education performance standards;  
10 (5) a description of the efforts by the department to assist a public  
11 school or district that receives a low performance designation under AS 14.03.123;  
12 (6) a description of intervention efforts by each school district and  
13 school for students who are not meeting state performance standards; [AND]  
14 (7) the number and percentage of turnover in certificated personnel and  
15 superintendents;  
16 **(8) a summary of the categories of certificated administrative**  
17 **employees employed by each school district that includes the ratio of**  
18 **(A) the number of certificated administrative employees in**  
19 **each category employed by each school district compared to the number**  
20 **of students enrolled in the school district on October 1 of the previous**  
21 **year;**  
22 **(B) the total number of certificated administrative**  
23 **employees employed by each school district compared to the total number**  
24 **of teachers employed by the school district on October 1 of the previous**  
25 **year; and**  
26 **(C) the total number of teachers employed by each school**  
27 **district compared to the total number of students enrolled in the school**  
28 **district on October 1 of the previous year;**  
29 **(9) the progress made to implement the reading intervention**  
30 **programs established under AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.780, including data on how**  
31 **school districts are using in-service days for culturally responsive professional**

1        **development in reading instruction; and**

2                        **(10) the effectiveness and participation rates of the parents as**  
3        **teachers program established under AS 14.03.420, including measures of**  
4        **efficiency and effectiveness that demonstrate the effects of the program on school**  
5        **readiness.**

6        \* **Sec. 8.** AS 14.03.078(a), as amended by sec. 7 of this Act, is amended to read:

7                (a) The department shall provide to the legislature and school districts by  
8        February 15 of each year by electronic means an annual report regarding the progress  
9        of each school and school district toward high academic performance by all students.  
10       The report required under this section must include

11                        (1) information described under AS 14.03.120;

12                        (2) progress of the department

13                                (A) toward implementing the school accountability provisions  
14        of AS 14.03.123; and

15                                (B) in assisting high schools to become accredited;

16                        (3) a description of the resources provided to each school and school  
17        district for coordinated school improvement activities and staff training in each school  
18        and school district;

19                        (4) each school district's and each school's progress in aligning  
20        curriculum with state education performance standards;

21                        (5) a description of the efforts by the department to assist a public  
22        school or district that receives a low performance designation under AS 14.03.123;

23                        (6) a description of intervention efforts by each school district and  
24        school for students who are not meeting state performance standards;

25                        (7) the number and percentage of turnover in certificated personnel and  
26        superintendents; **and**

27                        (8) a summary of the categories of certificated administrative  
28        employees employed by each school district that includes the ratio of

29                                (A) the number of certificated administrative employees in  
30        each category employed by each school district compared to the number of  
31        students enrolled in the school district on October 1 of the previous year;

1 (B) the total number of certificated administrative employees  
2 employed by each school district compared to the total number of teachers  
3 employed by the school district on October 1 of the previous year; and

4 (C) the total number of teachers employed by each school  
5 district compared to the total number of students enrolled in the school district  
6 on October 1 of the previous year [;

7 (9) THE PROGRESS MADE TO IMPLEMENT THE READING  
8 INTERVENTION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.780,  
9 INCLUDING DATA ON HOW SCHOOL DISTRICTS ARE USING IN-SERVICE  
10 DAYS FOR CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN  
11 READING INSTRUCTION; AND

12 (10) THE EFFECTIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION RATES OF  
13 THE PARENTS AS TEACHERS PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER  
14 AS 14.03.420, INCLUDING MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY AND  
15 EFFECTIVENESS THAT DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAM  
16 ON SCHOOL READINESS].

17 \* **Sec. 9.** AS 14.03.078 is amended by adding new subsections to read:

18 (c) Each school district shall make available to the public the portion of the  
19 report under (a)(8) of this section that pertains to the school district by posting the  
20 information in a prominent location on the school district's or local community's  
21 Internet website or by another easily accessible method.

22 (d) In this section, "administrative employee" means an employee who does  
23 not provide direct classroom instruction for students as a regular part of the  
24 employee's job.

25 \* **Sec. 10.** AS 14.03.080(c) is amended to read:

26 (c) A child under school age **who is at least four years of age at the**  
27 **beginning of the school year** may be admitted to a public school in the school district  
28 of which the child is a resident at the discretion of the governing body of the school  
29 district if the child meets minimum standards prescribed by the board evidencing that  
30 the child has the mental, physical, and emotional capacity to perform satisfactorily for  
31 the educational program being offered. A district's educational program must prescribe

1 that, except for students in an early education program, under school age students  
2 advance through the curriculum or grade level by the following school year. A  
3 governing body may delegate the authority granted under this subsection to the chief  
4 school administrator of the school district.

5 \* **Sec. 11.** AS 14.03.080(c), as amended by sec. 10 of this Act, is amended to read:

6 (c) A child under school age [WHO IS AT LEAST FOUR YEARS OF AGE  
7 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SCHOOL YEAR] may be admitted to a public  
8 school in the school district of which the child is a resident at the discretion of the  
9 governing body of the school district if the child meets minimum standards prescribed  
10 by the board evidencing that the child has the mental, physical, and emotional capacity  
11 to perform satisfactorily for the educational program being offered. A district's  
12 educational program must prescribe that [, EXCEPT FOR STUDENTS IN AN  
13 EARLY EDUCATION PROGRAM,] under school age students advance through the  
14 curriculum or grade level by the following school year. A governing body may  
15 delegate the authority granted under this subsection to the chief school administrator  
16 of the school district.

17 \* **Sec. 12.** AS 14.03.080 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

18 (g) A child who is five years of age on or before September 1 following the  
19 beginning of the school year, and who is under school age, may enter a public school  
20 kindergarten.

21 \* **Sec. 13.** AS 14.03.120 is amended by adding new subsections to read:

22 (h) To the extent allowable under state and federal privacy laws, each district  
23 shall annually report to the department information from the previous school year  
24 regarding

25 (1) the number of students and teaching staff assigned to each  
26 classroom in grades kindergarten through three;

27 (2) the number and percentage of students

28 (A) in grades kindergarten through three who demonstrated  
29 improvement on expected grade-level skills on the statewide screening tool;

30 (B) in grades kindergarten through three who performed below  
31 expected grade-level skills on the statewide screening tool, by grade;

1 (C) in grades kindergarten through three who did not progress  
2 to the next grade and the reasons the students did not progress;

3 (D) in grade three who demonstrated sufficient reading skills to  
4 progress to grade four based on the statewide screening tool;

5 (E) in grade three who progressed to grade four based on a  
6 waiver under AS 14.30.765(f);

7 (F) in grade three who demonstrated sufficient reading skills to  
8 progress to grade four based on an alternative standardized reading screening;

9 (G) in grade three who demonstrated sufficient reading skills to  
10 progress to grade four based on a student reading portfolio;

11 (3) the performance on the statewide screening tool of students in a  
12 grade above grade three who did not progress to grade four or who progressed to grade  
13 four based on a waiver under AS 14.30.765(f).

14 (i) To the extent allowable under state and federal privacy laws, the  
15 department shall post on the department's Internet website and make available for  
16 download the information reported under this section. The department shall post the  
17 information in a single downloadable comma-separated values file or a similar single  
18 downloadable file that allows data storage in tabular format. The file must include the  
19 comprehensive information about each public school reported under (d) and (e) of this  
20 section in a single list that may be sorted and compared.

21 (j) If the department receives the information required to be reported under  
22 this section from multiple sources, the department shall consolidate the information.  
23 Nothing in this section requires a district to provide duplicate information to the  
24 department in separate documents.

25 \* **Sec. 14.** AS 14.03 is amended by adding new sections to read:

26 **Article 4. Early Education.**

27 **Sec. 14.03.410. Early education programs; grants.** (a) The department shall  
28 provide training and assistance to develop and improve district-wide early education  
29 programs that comply with standards adopted by the board under AS 14.07.165(a)(5).

30 (b) The department may award a grant to provide funding for a three-year  
31 period for the development or improvement of a district-wide early education program

1 to a district that has not received a grant under this section, applies in a format  
2 prescribed by the department, provides the information required under (g) of this  
3 section, and is eligible for a grant as specified under (c) of this section. Unless the  
4 legislature appropriates another amount, total grant funding awarded to districts under  
5 this subsection may not exceed \$3,000,000 in a fiscal year.

6 (c) The department shall rank the performance of each district in the state in  
7 accordance with the accountability system and performance designations required  
8 under AS 14.03.123. When approving grants under (b) of this section, the department  
9 shall prioritize eligible districts with lower performance based on the department's  
10 ranking of districts under this subsection. A district is eligible for a grant if the  
11 department determines an insufficient number of children in the district attend high  
12 quality child care programs, including head start programs, early education programs  
13 provided by a local government, and early education programs provided by child  
14 development agencies, that

15 (1) meet or exceed the standards adopted by the board under  
16 AS 14.07.165(a)(5); and

17 (2) would continue operating after development of a district early  
18 education program.

19 (d) If the department does not approve the early education program of a  
20 district awarded a grant under (b) of this section by the end of the district's three-year  
21 grant period, the department may provide a one-year remediation grant to allow the  
22 district one additional fiscal year to meet the early education program standards  
23 adopted by the board under AS 14.07.165(a)(5). If the district is unable to meet the  
24 early education program standards at the end of that fiscal year, the department may,  
25 in the discretion of the commissioner, provide an additional remediation grant to allow  
26 the district not more than one additional fiscal year to meet the standards. Nothing in  
27 this section prohibits a district from using its own funds to continue the remediation  
28 process.

29 (e) A student in an early education program may not be counted in a district's  
30 ADM under AS 14.17.500 unless the department has approved the program.

31 (f) A grant under this section is subject to appropriation, but may not supplant



1 other early education funding available to districts.

2 (g) Before applying for a grant under (b) of this section, a district shall, to  
3 avoid duplicate programs and facilitate resource sharing to improve early education  
4 within the district, consult with each local and tribal head start program within the  
5 district's boundaries. An application submitted under (b) of this section must include  
6 documentation establishing that the district consulted with each local and tribal head  
7 start program within the district.

8 (h) In this section,

9 (1) "ADM" has the meaning given in AS 14.17.990;

10 (2) "district" has the meaning given in AS 14.17.990;

11 (3) "early education program" means a program, the primary function  
12 of which is educational, for children who are four and five years of age and who have  
13 not attended a public school kindergarten.

14 **Sec. 14.03.420. Parents as teachers program.** (a) The department shall  
15 design and implement a statewide parents as teachers program for the benefit of  
16 children who are under five years of age. The program must provide a system of early  
17 childhood education that

18 (1) is evidence-based;

19 (2) involves parents;

20 (3) is consistent with available research and best practices for high  
21 quality early childhood education;

22 (4) incorporates guidelines adopted by the department for early  
23 learning that

24 (A) enhance school readiness;

25 (B) increase parent understanding of child development and  
26 developmental milestones;

27 (C) reduce the incidence of child abuse and neglect;

28 (D) increase identification of health problems and  
29 developmental delays through regular screenings;

30 (E) improve child health indicators, including immunization  
31 rates; and

1 (F) increase parental involvement; and  
2 (5) provides for effective and efficient coordination with or expansion  
3 of early education programs operating in the state, to the extent permitted by law.

4 (b) A school district shall, to the extent space is needed and available, provide  
5 for the use of a room in a school at no charge to support the program established under  
6 this section.

7 (c) The department shall develop and enter into local partnerships to  
8 implement the program established under this section.

9 \* **Sec. 15.** AS 14.07.020(a) is amended to read:

10 (a) The department shall

11 (1) exercise general supervision over the public schools of the state  
12 except the University of Alaska;

13 (2) study the conditions and needs of the public schools of the state,  
14 adopt or recommend plans, administer and evaluate grants to improve school  
15 performance awarded under AS 14.03.125, and adopt regulations for the improvement  
16 of the public schools; the department may consult with the University of Alaska to  
17 develop secondary education requirements to improve student achievement in college  
18 preparatory courses;

19 (3) provide advisory and consultative services to all public school  
20 governing bodies and personnel;

21 (4) prescribe by regulation a minimum course of study for the public  
22 schools; the regulations must provide that, if a course in American Sign Language is  
23 given, the course shall be given credit as a course in a foreign language;

24 (5) establish, in coordination with the Department of Health and Social  
25 Services, a program for the continuing education of children who are held in juvenile  
26 detention facilities or juvenile treatment facilities, as those terms are defined in  
27 AS 47.12.990, in the state during the period of detention or treatment;

28 (6) accredit those public schools that meet accreditation standards  
29 prescribed by regulation by the department; these regulations shall be adopted by the  
30 department and presented to the legislature during the first 10 days of any regular  
31 session, and become effective 45 days after presentation or at the end of the session,

1       whichever is earlier, unless disapproved by a resolution concurred in by a majority of  
2       the members of each house;

3               (7)   prescribe by regulation, after consultation with the state fire  
4       marshal and the state sanitarian, standards that will ensure healthful and safe  
5       conditions in the public and private schools of the state, including a requirement of  
6       physical examinations and immunizations in pre-elementary schools; the standards for  
7       private schools may not be more stringent than those for public schools;

8               (8)   exercise general supervision over **early education programs**  
9       [PRE-ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS] that receive direct state or federal funding,  
10       **including early education programs provided by a school district for students**  
11       **four and five years of age, approve an early education program provided by a**  
12       **school district that complies with the standards adopted by the board under**  
13       **AS 14.07.165(a)(5), and revoke approval of an early education program if the**  
14       **program does not comply with the standards adopted by the board under**  
15       **AS 14.07.165(a)(5);**

16              (9)   exercise general supervision over elementary and secondary  
17       correspondence study programs offered by municipal school districts or regional  
18       educational attendance areas; the department may also offer and make available to any  
19       Alaskan through a centralized office a correspondence study program;

20              (10)  accredit private schools that request accreditation and that meet  
21       accreditation standards prescribed by regulation by the department; nothing in this  
22       paragraph authorizes the department to require religious or other private schools to be  
23       licensed;

24              (11)  review plans for construction of new public elementary and  
25       secondary schools and for additions to and major rehabilitation of existing public  
26       elementary and secondary schools and, in accordance with regulations adopted by the  
27       department, determine and approve the extent of eligibility for state aid of a school  
28       construction or major maintenance project; for the purposes of this paragraph, "plans"  
29       include educational specifications, schematic designs, projected energy consumption  
30       and costs, and final contract documents;

31              (12)  provide educational opportunities in the areas of vocational

1 education and training, and basic education to individuals over 16 years of age who  
2 are no longer attending school; the department may consult with businesses and labor  
3 unions to develop a program to prepare students for apprenticeships or internships that  
4 will lead to employment opportunities;

5 (13) administer the grants awarded under AS 14.11;

6 (14) establish, in coordination with the Department of Public Safety, a  
7 school bus driver training course;

8 (15) require the reporting of information relating to school disciplinary  
9 and safety programs under AS 14.33.120 and of incidents of disruptive or violent  
10 behavior;

11 (16) establish by regulation criteria, based on low student performance,  
12 under which the department may intervene in a school district to improve instructional  
13 practices, as described in AS 14.07.030(a)(14) or (15); the regulations must include

14 (A) a notice provision that alerts the district to the deficiencies  
15 and the instructional practice changes proposed by the department;

16 (B) an end date for departmental intervention, as described in  
17 AS 14.07.030(a)(14)(A) and (B) and (15), after the district demonstrates three  
18 consecutive years of improvement consisting of not less than two percent  
19 increases in student proficiency on standards-based assessments in language  
20 arts and mathematics, as provided in AS 14.03.123(f)(1)(A); and

21 (C) a process for districts to petition the department for  
22 continuing or discontinuing the department's intervention;

23 (17) notify the legislative committees having jurisdiction over  
24 education before intervening in a school district under AS 14.07.030(a)(14) or  
25 redirecting public school funding under AS 14.07.030(a)(15);

26 **(18) establish a reading program to provide direct support for and**  
27 **intervention in the reading intervention programs of participating schools as**  
28 **described in AS 14.30.765 and 14.30.770;**

29 **(19) annually convene, either in person or electronically, a panel to**  
30 **review and comment on the effectiveness of the programs created by the**  
31 **department and the regulations adopted by the board to implement AS 14.03.410,**

1 14.03.420, AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.770, and 14.30.800; the panel

2 (A) shall provide recommendations and guidance to the  
3 board, the department, and the legislature on how to integrate early  
4 education and reading programs created under this title with tribal  
5 compacting or programs focused on cultural education within the  
6 department;

7 (B) shall discuss support for reading in Alaska Native  
8 languages and other non-English languages;

9 (C) must collectively represent the regions of the state and  
10 include teachers of grades kindergarten through three, school  
11 administrators, parents of students in grades kindergarten through three,  
12 stakeholders from indigenous language immersion programs,  
13 representatives from early education stakeholder groups, and researchers  
14 of best practices for improving literacy performance, including best  
15 practices for instruction of indigenous students and students whose first  
16 language is not English.

17 \* **Sec. 16.** AS 14.07.020(a), as amended by sec. 15 of this Act, is amended to read:

18 (a) The department shall

19 (1) exercise general supervision over the public schools of the state  
20 except the University of Alaska;

21 (2) study the conditions and needs of the public schools of the state,  
22 adopt or recommend plans, administer and evaluate grants to improve school  
23 performance awarded under AS 14.03.125, and adopt regulations for the improvement  
24 of the public schools; the department may consult with the University of Alaska to  
25 develop secondary education requirements to improve student achievement in college  
26 preparatory courses;

27 (3) provide advisory and consultative services to all public school  
28 governing bodies and personnel;

29 (4) prescribe by regulation a minimum course of study for the public  
30 schools; the regulations must provide that, if a course in American Sign Language is  
31 given, the course shall be given credit as a course in a foreign language;

1 (5) establish, in coordination with the Department of Health and Social  
2 Services, a program for the continuing education of children who are held in juvenile  
3 detention facilities or juvenile treatment facilities, as those terms are defined in  
4 AS 47.12.990, in the state during the period of detention or treatment;

5 (6) accredit those public schools that meet accreditation standards  
6 prescribed by regulation by the department; these regulations shall be adopted by the  
7 department and presented to the legislature during the first 10 days of any regular  
8 session, and become effective 45 days after presentation or at the end of the session,  
9 whichever is earlier, unless disapproved by a resolution concurred in by a majority of  
10 the members of each house;

11 (7) prescribe by regulation, after consultation with the state fire  
12 marshal and the state sanitarian, standards that will ensure healthful and safe  
13 conditions in the public and private schools of the state, including a requirement of  
14 physical examinations and immunizations in pre-elementary schools; the standards for  
15 private schools may not be more stringent than those for public schools;

16 (8) exercise general supervision over early education programs that  
17 receive direct state or federal funding, including early education programs provided by  
18 a school district for students four and five years of age [, APPROVE AN EARLY  
19 EDUCATION PROGRAM PROVIDED BY A SCHOOL DISTRICT THAT  
20 COMPLIES WITH THE STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD UNDER  
21 AS 14.07.165(a)(5), AND REVOKE APPROVAL OF AN EARLY EDUCATION  
22 PROGRAM IF THE PROGRAM DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS  
23 ADOPTED BY THE BOARD UNDER AS 14.07.165(a)(5)];

24 (9) exercise general supervision over elementary and secondary  
25 correspondence study programs offered by municipal school districts or regional  
26 educational attendance areas; the department may also offer and make available to any  
27 Alaskan through a centralized office a correspondence study program;

28 (10) accredit private schools that request accreditation and that meet  
29 accreditation standards prescribed by regulation by the department; nothing in this  
30 paragraph authorizes the department to require religious or other private schools to be  
31 licensed;

1                   (11) review plans for construction of new public elementary and  
2 secondary schools and for additions to and major rehabilitation of existing public  
3 elementary and secondary schools and, in accordance with regulations adopted by the  
4 department, determine and approve the extent of eligibility for state aid of a school  
5 construction or major maintenance project; for the purposes of this paragraph, "plans"  
6 include educational specifications, schematic designs, projected energy consumption  
7 and costs, and final contract documents;

8                   (12) provide educational opportunities in the areas of vocational  
9 education and training, and basic education to individuals over 16 years of age who  
10 are no longer attending school; the department may consult with businesses and labor  
11 unions to develop a program to prepare students for apprenticeships or internships that  
12 will lead to employment opportunities;

13                   (13) administer the grants awarded under AS 14.11;

14                   (14) establish, in coordination with the Department of Public Safety, a  
15 school bus driver training course;

16                   (15) require the reporting of information relating to school disciplinary  
17 and safety programs under AS 14.33.120 and of incidents of disruptive or violent  
18 behavior;

19                   (16) establish by regulation criteria, based on low student performance,  
20 under which the department may intervene in a school district to improve instructional  
21 practices, as described in AS 14.07.030(a)(14) or (15); the regulations must include

22                           (A) a notice provision that alerts the district to the deficiencies  
23 and the instructional practice changes proposed by the department;

24                           (B) an end date for departmental intervention, as described in  
25 AS 14.07.030(a)(14)(A) and (B) and (15), after the district demonstrates three  
26 consecutive years of improvement consisting of not less than two percent  
27 increases in student proficiency on standards-based assessments in language  
28 arts and mathematics, as provided in AS 14.03.123(f)(1)(A); and

29                           (C) a process for districts to petition the department for  
30 continuing or discontinuing the department's intervention;

31                   (17) notify the legislative committees having jurisdiction over

1 education before intervening in a school district under AS 14.07.030(a)(14) or  
2 redirecting public school funding under AS 14.07.030(a)(15) [;

3 (18) ESTABLISH A READING PROGRAM TO PROVIDE DIRECT  
4 SUPPORT FOR AND INTERVENTION IN THE READING INTERVENTION  
5 PROGRAMS OF PARTICIPATING SCHOOLS AS DESCRIBED IN AS 14.30.765  
6 AND 14.30.770;

7 (19) ANNUALLY CONVENE, EITHER IN PERSON OR  
8 ELECTRONICALLY, A PANEL TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON THE  
9 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAMS CREATED BY THE DEPARTMENT  
10 AND THE REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD TO IMPLEMENT  
11 AS 14.03.410, 14.03.420, AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.770, AND 14.30.800; THE PANEL

12 (A) SHALL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
13 GUIDANCE TO THE BOARD, THE DEPARTMENT, AND THE  
14 LEGISLATURE ON HOW TO INTEGRATE EARLY EDUCATION AND  
15 READING PROGRAMS CREATED UNDER THIS TITLE WITH TRIBAL  
16 COMPACTING OR PROGRAMS FOCUSED ON CULTURAL  
17 EDUCATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT;

18 (B) SHALL DISCUSS SUPPORT FOR READING IN  
19 ALASKA NATIVE LANGUAGES AND OTHER NON-ENGLISH  
20 LANGUAGES;

21 (C) MUST COLLECTIVELY REPRESENT THE REGIONS  
22 OF THE STATE AND INCLUDE TEACHERS OF GRADES  
23 KINDERGARTEN THROUGH THREE, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS,  
24 PARENTS OF STUDENTS IN GRADES KINDERGARTEN THROUGH  
25 THREE, STAKEHOLDERS FROM INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE  
26 IMMERSION PROGRAMS, REPRESENTATIVES FROM EARLY  
27 EDUCATION STAKEHOLDER GROUPS, AND RESEARCHERS OF BEST  
28 PRACTICES FOR IMPROVING LITERACY PERFORMANCE,  
29 INCLUDING BEST PRACTICES FOR INSTRUCTION OF INDIGENOUS  
30 STUDENTS AND STUDENTS WHOSE FIRST LANGUAGE IS NOT  
31 ENGLISH].



1     \* **Sec. 17.** AS 14.07.020(c) is amended to read:

2                     (c) In this section, **"early education program"** ["PRE-ELEMENTARY  
3             SCHOOL"] means a **program** [SCHOOL] for children ages three through five years if  
4             the **program's** [SCHOOL'S] primary function is educational.

5     \* **Sec. 18.** AS 14.07.030(a) is amended to read:

6                     (a) The department may

7                             (1) establish, maintain, govern, operate, discontinue, and combine area,  
8             regional, and special schools;

9                             (2) enter into contractual agreements with the Bureau of Indian Affairs  
10             or with a school district to share boarding costs of secondary school students;

11                            (3) provide for citizenship night schools when and where expedient;

12                            (4) provide for the sale or other disposition of abandoned or obsolete  
13             buildings and other state-owned school property;

14                            (5) prescribe a classification for items of expense of school districts;

15                            (6) acquire and transfer personal property, acquire real property, and  
16             transfer real property to federal agencies, state agencies, or to political subdivisions;

17                            (7) enter into contractual agreements with school districts to provide  
18             more efficient or economical education services; reasonable fees may be charged by  
19             the department to cover the costs of providing services under an agreement, including  
20             costs for professional services, reproduction or printing, and mailing and distribution  
21             of educational materials;

22                            (8) provide for the issuance of elementary and secondary diplomas to  
23             persons not in school who have completed the equivalent of an 8th or 12th grade  
24             education, respectively, in accordance with standards established by the department;

25                            (9) apply for, accept, and spend endowments, grants, and other private  
26             money available to the state for educational purposes in accordance with AS 37.07  
27             (Executive Budget Act);

28                            (10) set student tuition and fees for educational and extracurricular  
29             programs and services provided and schools operated by the department under the  
30             provisions of (1) of this section and AS 14.07.020(a)(9), (11), and (12);

31                            (11) charge fees to cover the costs of care and handling with respect to

1 the acquisition, warehousing, distribution, or transfer of donated foods;

2 (12) establish and collect fees for the rental of school facilities and for  
3 other programs and services provided by the schools;

4 (13) develop a model curriculum and provide technical assistance for  
5 early childhood education programs;

6 (14) notwithstanding any other provision of this title, intervene in a  
7 school district to improve instructional practices under standards established by the  
8 department in regulation, including directing the

9 (A) employees identified by the department to exercise  
10 supervisory authority for instructional practices in the district or in a specified  
11 school;

12 (B) use of appropriations under this title for distribution to a  
13 district;

14 (15) notwithstanding any other provision of this title, redirect public  
15 school funding under AS 14.17 appropriated for distribution to a school district, after  
16 providing notice to the district and an opportunity for the district to respond, [WHEN]

17 (A) **when** necessary to contract for services to improve  
18 instructional practices in the district; [OR]

19 (B) **when** the district has failed to take an action required by  
20 the department to improve instructional practices in the district; if funding is  
21 redirected under this subparagraph, the department shall provide the redirected  
22 funding to the district when the department has determined that the required  
23 action is satisfactorily completed; **or**

24 **(C) in accordance with AS 14.07.070, when the district has**  
25 **failed to comply with the school laws of the state or with the regulations**  
26 **adopted by the department.**

27 \* **Sec. 19.** AS 14.07.050 is amended to read:

28 **Sec. 14.07.050. Selection of textbooks.** Textbooks for use in the public  
29 schools of the state, including a **district-offered** [DISTRICT OFFERED] statewide  
30 correspondence study program, shall be selected by district boards for district schools.  
31 Nothing in this section precludes

1                   **(1)** a correspondence study student, or the parent or guardian of a  
2 correspondence study student, from privately obtaining or using textbooks or  
3 curriculum material not provided by the school district;

4                   **(2) the department from selecting and purchasing supplementary**  
5 **reading textbooks and materials for school districts to support reading**  
6 **intervention services provided under AS 14.30.765 and 14.30.770.**

7 \* **Sec. 20.** AS 14.07.050, as amended by sec. 19 of this Act, is amended to read:

8                   **Sec. 14.07.050. Selection of textbooks.** Textbooks for use in the public  
9 schools of the state, including a district-offered statewide correspondence study  
10 program, shall be selected by district boards for district schools. Nothing in this  
11 section precludes

12                   [(1)] a correspondence study student, or the parent or guardian of a  
13 correspondence study student, from privately obtaining or using textbooks or  
14 curriculum material not provided by the school district [;

15                   (2) THE DEPARTMENT FROM SELECTING AND PURCHASING  
16 SUPPLEMENTARY READING TEXTBOOKS AND MATERIALS FOR SCHOOL  
17 DISTRICTS TO SUPPORT READING INTERVENTION SERVICES PROVIDED  
18 UNDER AS 14.30.765 AND 14.30.770].

19 \* **Sec. 21.** AS 14.07.165(a) is amended to read:

20                   (a) The board shall adopt

21                   (1) statewide goals and require each governing body to adopt written  
22 goals that are consistent with local needs;

23                   (2) regulations regarding the application for and award of grants under  
24 AS 14.03.125;

25                   (3) regulations implementing provisions of AS 14.11.014(b);

26                   (4) regulations requiring approval by the board before a charter school,  
27 state boarding school, or a public school may provide domiciliary services;

28                   (5) **regulations establishing standards for an early education**  
29 **program provided by a school district for children who are four and five years of**  
30 **age; the regulations must include**

31                   **(A) standards for a locally designed, evidence-based**

1 program that meets Head Start Program Performance Standards and  
2 other federal standards required for early education programs to receive  
3 federal funding;

4 (B) a requirement that a teacher in charge of a program  
5 hold a valid teacher certificate issued under AS 14.20 and

6 (i) have satisfactorily completed a minimum of six  
7 credit hours in early childhood education or complete the  
8 minimum credit hours within two years of the date the teacher's  
9 employment with the early education program begins; or

10 (ii) have two or more years of experience teaching  
11 kindergarten or another early education program and have  
12 completed additional coursework related to reading instruction, as  
13 required by the department;

14 (C) developmentally appropriate objectives for children  
15 four and five years of age rather than academic standards appropriate for  
16 older children; the objectives must allow school districts to adapt the  
17 content of an early education program to be culturally responsive to local  
18 communities;

19 (D) accommodations for the needs of all early education  
20 children and their families regardless of socioeconomic circumstances;  
21 and

22 (E) standards for day in session requirements appropriate  
23 for children four and five years of age;

24 (6) regulations establishing standards for day in session  
25 requirements appropriate for kindergarten students [REPEALED].

26 \* **Sec. 22.** AS 14.07.168 is amended to read:

27 **Sec. 14.07.168. Report to the legislature.** Not later than the 30th legislative  
28 day of each regular session of the legislature, the board shall prepare and present in  
29 person to the legislative committees having jurisdiction over education an annual  
30 report that describes the efforts of the board to develop, maintain, and continuously  
31 improve a comprehensive quality public education system, as provided for under the

1 bylaws of the board. The report must include

2 (1) a summary of the resolves and rationales provided in support of  
3 policy decisions made under AS 14.03.015;

4 (2) program and curriculum changes made, discussed, or  
5 recommended in meetings held under AS 14.07.125;

6 (3) additional information relevant to efforts made to improve and  
7 maintain the public education system;

8 **(4) a summary of implementation and utilization of the consortium**  
9 **established under AS 14.30.800, including a review of consortium effectiveness**  
10 **and the participation rates of districts, teachers, and students.**

11 \* **Sec. 23.** AS 14.07.168, as amended by sec. 22 of this Act, is amended to read:

12 **Sec. 14.07.168. Report to the legislature.** Not later than the 30th legislative  
13 day of each regular session of the legislature, the board shall prepare and present in  
14 person to the legislative committees having jurisdiction over education an annual  
15 report that describes the efforts of the board to develop, maintain, and continuously  
16 improve a comprehensive quality public education system, as provided for under the  
17 bylaws of the board. The report must include

18 (1) a summary of the resolves and rationales provided in support of  
19 policy decisions made under AS 14.03.015;

20 (2) program and curriculum changes made, discussed, or  
21 recommended in meetings held under AS 14.07.125;

22 (3) additional information relevant to efforts made to improve and  
23 maintain the public education system [;

24 (4) A SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND UTILIZATION  
25 OF THE CONSORTIUM ESTABLISHED UNDER AS 14.30.800, INCLUDING A  
26 REVIEW OF CONSORTIUM EFFECTIVENESS AND THE PARTICIPATION  
27 RATES OF DISTRICTS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS].

28 \* **Sec. 24.** AS 14.07.180(a) is amended to read:

29 (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board shall establish  
30 standards and a procedure for the review, ranking, and approval of mathematics and  
31 English and language arts curricula for school districts to use in each grade level as

provided in this section. The board may include curricula delivered through virtual education in the standards and procedure established under this subsection. **Standards established for the review, ranking, and approval of language arts curricula for early education programs and grades kindergarten through three must be based on phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading comprehension.**

\* Sec. 25. AS 14.14.115(a) is amended to read:

(a) To encourage cooperative arrangements between school districts **and between school districts and private businesses, nonprofit organizations, or government agencies** to provide more efficient or economical administrative or educational services, a school district may receive a one-time cooperative arrangement grant from the department of up to \$100,000. **The department shall ensure that grant funds provided to districts under this section do not provide direct benefit to private educational institutions.**

\* Sec. 26. AS 14.17.470 is amended to read:

**Sec. 14.17.470. Base student allocation.** The base student allocation is **\$5,960** [\$5,930].

\* Sec. 27. AS 14.17.500 is amended by adding new subsections to read:

(d) Except as provided in (e) - (g) of this section, a student in a district-wide early education program provided by a school district and approved by the department under AS 14.07.020(a)(8) is counted as one-half of a full-time equivalent student.

(e) A school district may not include in a school's ADM students who are four and five years of age if the students are enrolled in an early education program that receives state or federal funding other than funding under this chapter.

(f) A school district may not include in a school's ADM students who are four and five years of age if inclusion of the students would result in an increase of total state aid attributable to district-wide early education programs approved under AS 14.03.410 of more than \$3,000,000 from the previous fiscal year. The department shall prioritize the funding of district-wide early education programs, giving priority to school districts with lower performance, based on the department's ranking of districts under AS 14.03.410(c). When the number of students in a district-wide early

1 education program will result in an increase of total state aid attributable to district-  
2 wide early education programs approved under AS 14.03.410 of more than \$3,000,000  
3 from the previous fiscal year, the department may identify the amount, up to  
4 \$3,000,000, available for the district's district-wide early education program.

5 (g) For purposes of AS 14.09.010, a student in a district-wide early education  
6 program provided by a school district and approved by the department under  
7 AS 14.07.020(a)(8) is counted as a full-time equivalent student.

8 \* **Sec. 28.** AS 14.17.500(d), enacted by sec. 27 of this Act, is amended to read:

9 (d) **A school district may not include in the school's ADM** [EXCEPT AS  
10 PROVIDED IN (e) - (g) OF THIS SECTION,] a student in a district-wide early  
11 education program provided by **the** [A SCHOOL] district [AND APPROVED BY  
12 THE DEPARTMENT UNDER AS 14.07.020(a)(8) IS COUNTED AS ONE-HALF  
13 OF A FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT].

14 \* **Sec. 29.** AS 14.17.905(a) is amended to read:

15 (a) For purposes of this chapter, the determination of the number of schools in  
16 a district is subject to the following:

17 (1) a community with an ADM of at least 10, but not more than 100,  
18 shall be counted as one school;

19 (2) a community with an ADM of at least 101, but not more than 425,  
20 shall be counted as

21 (A) one elementary school, which includes those students in  
22 grades kindergarten through six **and, except as provided in AS 14.17.500, in**  
23 **an early education program provided by a school district and approved by**  
24 **the department under AS 14.07.020(a)(8)**; and

25 (B) one secondary school, which includes students in grades  
26 seven through 12;

27 (3) in a community with an ADM of greater than 425, each facility that  
28 is administered as a separate school shall be counted as one school, except that each  
29 alternative school with an ADM of less than 175 shall be counted as a part of the  
30 school in the district with the highest ADM.

31 \* **Sec. 30.** AS 14.17.905(a), as amended by sec. 29 of this Act, is amended to read:

1 (a) For purposes of this chapter, the determination of the number of schools in  
2 a district is subject to the following:

3 (1) a community with an ADM of at least 10, but not more than 100,  
4 shall be counted as one school;

5 (2) a community with an ADM of at least 101, but not more than 425,  
6 shall be counted as

7 (A) one elementary school, which includes those students in  
8 grades kindergarten through six [AND, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN  
9 AS 14.17.500, IN AN EARLY EDUCATION PROGRAM PROVIDED BY A  
10 SCHOOL DISTRICT AND APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT UNDER  
11 AS 14.07.020(a)(8)]; and

12 (B) one secondary school, which includes students in grades  
13 seven through 12;

14 (3) in a community with an ADM of greater than 425, each facility that  
15 is administered as a separate school shall be counted as one school, except that each  
16 alternative school with an ADM of less than 175 shall be counted as a part of the  
17 school in the district with the highest ADM.

18 \* **Sec. 31.** AS 14.17.905(c) is amended to read:

19 (c) Notwithstanding (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section, in a community with an  
20 ADM of greater than 425 that has only one facility administered as a school,  
21 **excluding charter schools,** for students in grades kindergarten through 12, the  
22 number of schools for the community shall be counted under (a)(2) of this section.

23 \* **Sec. 32.** AS 14.20.015(c) is amended to read:

24 (c) The preliminary teacher certificate issued under this section must contain  
25 the same endorsements as those on the current valid teacher certificate issued by the  
26 other state. **However, before teaching students in grades kindergarten through**  
27 **three, a teacher certificated under this section must complete coursework,**  
28 **training, or testing requirements, and demonstrate proficiency as determined by**  
29 **the department, in phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary development,**  
30 **reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading comprehension approved by**  
31 **the board in regulation. A teacher may apply coursework, training, or testing**



1        requirements completed under this subsection toward continuing education  
2        requirements established by the board in regulation.

3        \* **Sec. 33.** AS 14.20.015(c), as amended by sec. 32 of this Act, is amended to read:

4                (c) The preliminary teacher certificate issued under this section must contain  
5        the same endorsements as those on the current valid teacher certificate issued by the  
6        other state. [HOWEVER, BEFORE TEACHING STUDENTS IN GRADES  
7        KINDERGARTEN THROUGH THREE, A TEACHER CERTIFICATED UNDER  
8        THIS SECTION MUST COMPLETE COURSEWORK, TRAINING, OR TESTING  
9        REQUIREMENTS IN PHONEMIC AWARENESS, PHONICS, VOCABULARY  
10       DEVELOPMENT, READING FLUENCY, ORAL LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND  
11       READING COMPREHENSION APPROVED BY THE BOARD IN REGULATION.  
12       A TEACHER MAY APPLY COURSEWORK, TRAINING, OR TESTING  
13       REQUIREMENTS COMPLETED UNDER THIS SUBSECTION TOWARD  
14       CONTINUING EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE  
15       BOARD IN REGULATION.]

16       \* **Sec. 34.** AS 14.20.020(i) is amended to read:

17                (i) A [BEGINNING ON JULY 1, 1998, A] person is not eligible for an initial  
18       regular teacher certificate unless the person has taken and successfully completed a  
19       competency examination or examinations designated, at the time the person took the  
20       test, by the board. The board shall review nationally recognized examinations that are  
21       designed to test the competency of new teachers and shall designate those  
22       examinations that it finds adequately test the skills and abilities of new teachers. For  
23       each examination designated under this subsection, the board shall establish the  
24       minimum acceptable level of performance, including a passing score. The board  
25       shall reevaluate the passing score for a competency examination at least once  
26       every five years and shall review each examination designated by the board at  
27       least once every three years. The board shall prioritize the review of those  
28       examinations for which the minimum passing score deviates the most from the  
29       mean passing score adopted by other jurisdictions. When reevaluating a passing  
30       score for a competency examination, the board shall consider the historical effect  
31       of the established passing score, the potential effect of changing the passing score,

and the passing score currently used for the examination by other jurisdictions.  
The board may allow a teacher who passed a comparable competency  
examination required by another jurisdiction to use a score from the other  
jurisdiction to satisfy the competency examination requirements under this  
subsection. The board shall adopt regulations to implement this subsection. A  
regulation that changes the passing score on a competency examination takes  
effect on the date that is one year after the date the board adopts the regulation,  
or a later date prescribed by the board. In this subsection, "competency  
examination" includes a basic competency examination with components in  
reading, writing, and mathematics and a subject area examination that is specific  
to the subject area in which the teacher will be teaching.

\* **Sec. 35.** AS 14.20.020 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

(l) Before teaching students in grades kindergarten through three, a teacher certificated under this section must complete coursework, training, or testing requirements in phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading comprehension approved by the board in regulation. A teacher may apply coursework, training, or testing requirements completed under this subsection toward continuing education requirements established by the board in regulation.

\* **Sec. 36.** AS 14.30 is amended by adding new sections to read:

#### **Article 15. Reading Intervention.**

**Sec. 14.30.760. Statewide screening and support.** (a) To implement the district reading intervention services established under AS 14.30.765, the department shall

(1) adopt a statewide screening tool to administer to students in grades kindergarten through three to identify students with reading deficiencies, including students with characteristics of dyslexia; the screening tool must evaluate

(A) phonemic awareness, letter naming fluency, letter sound fluency, and letter word sound fluency of students in kindergarten;

(B) letter word sound fluency and oral reading fluency of students in grade one;

1 (C) vocabulary and oral reading fluency of students in grades  
2 two and three;

3 (2) support teachers of grades kindergarten through three by

4 (A) administering the statewide screening tool three times each  
5 school year, once in the fall, once in the winter, and once in the spring, to all  
6 students in grades kindergarten through three, with the exception of students  
7 who demonstrate sufficient reading skills on the first screening of the school  
8 year;

9 (B) providing methods to monitor student progress;

10 (C) providing targeted instruction based on student needs as  
11 determined by the results of the screening tool; and

12 (D) providing additional assistance as determined by the  
13 department;

14 (3) provide training to school district staff related to using the results  
15 of the statewide screening tool and understanding evidence-based reading  
16 interventions, including explicit and systematic instruction in phonemic awareness,  
17 phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading  
18 comprehension;

19 (4) require that districts identify the early education programs attended  
20 by students and report to the department the average score on each performance  
21 screening tool by students in grades kindergarten through three who

22 (A) attended a state-approved early education program;

23 (B) attended a head start program;

24 (C) attended a private early education program;

25 (D) did not attend an early education program;

26 (5) establish a process that allows the commissioner to waive, upon  
27 request, use of the statewide screening tool required under this subsection by a school  
28 district if the school district has adopted an evidence-based reading screening tool and  
29 the screening tool is approved by the department;

30 (6) review, approve, and assist districts developing alternative  
31 standardized reading screening tools in any language for use by school districts.

1 (b) In adopting a statewide screening tool under (a)(1) of this section, the  
2 department shall consider the following factors:

3 (1) the amount of time needed to administer the screening with the  
4 intention of minimizing effects on instructional time;

5 (2) the time frame for reporting screening results to teachers,  
6 administrators, and parents or guardians;

7 (3) the integration of the screening with student instruction and  
8 department support;

9 (4) recommendations from a task force, working group, or committee  
10 created by law and charged with studying issues related to reading proficiency and  
11 reading deficiencies; and

12 (5) whether the screening tool is culturally responsive.

13 **Sec. 14.30.765. Reading intervention services and strategies; progression.**

14 (a) Each school district shall offer intensive reading intervention services to students  
15 in grades kindergarten through three who exhibit a reading deficiency to assist  
16 students in achieving reading proficiency at or above grade level by the end of grade  
17 three. The district shall provide the intensive reading intervention services in addition  
18 to the core reading instruction that is provided to all students in the general education  
19 classroom. The intensive reading intervention services must, to the extent practicable,

20 (1) be provided by a district reading teacher, or paraprofessional under  
21 the supervision of a reading teacher, to all students in grades kindergarten through  
22 three who are determined to have a reading deficiency based on the statewide  
23 screening tool adopted under AS 14.30.760(a)(1);

24 (2) provide explicit and systematic instruction in phonemic awareness,  
25 phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading  
26 comprehension, as necessary;

27 (3) use evidence-based reading intervention methods that have shown  
28 proven results in accelerating student reading achievement within a single school year;

29 (4) include instruction with detailed explanations, extensive  
30 opportunities for guided practice, and opportunities for error correction and feedback;

31 (5) incorporate daily targeted small group reading instruction based on

1 student needs, either in person or online;

2 (6) monitor the reading progress of each student's reading skills  
3 throughout the school year and adjust instruction according to student needs;

4 (7) be implemented during regular school hours through any available  
5 method, including in person or through online delivery by teachers or specialty  
6 reading coaches;

7 (8) be implemented outside of regular school hours, as directed in the  
8 student's individual reading improvement plan under (b) of this section, for a student  
9 who scores at the lowest achievement level on the statewide screening tool;

10 (9) be reviewed based on a department-approved response to  
11 intervention or multi-tiered system support models, addressing additional support and  
12 services needed to remedy identified needs; and

13 (10) support reading intervention at home by parents or guardians by  
14 offering a list of adult literacy resources and organizations, providing opportunities for  
15 parent or guardian participation in training workshops, and encouraging regular parent  
16 or guardian-guided home reading activities.

17 (b) In addition to the reading intervention services provided under (a) of this  
18 section, a school district shall provide an individual reading improvement plan for  
19 each student in grades kindergarten through three who is determined to have a reading  
20 deficiency based on the statewide screening tool. An individual reading improvement  
21 plan developed under this section must

22 (1) be implemented not later than 30 days after identification of the  
23 reading deficiency;

24 (2) be created by the student's reading teacher in consultation with the  
25 school principal, the student's parent or guardian, and other pertinent district staff;

26 (3) describe the evidence-based reading intervention services the  
27 student will receive to achieve and demonstrate sufficient reading skills;

28 (4) provide reading intervention services outside of regular school  
29 hours for a student who scores at the lowest achievement level on the statewide  
30 screening tool consistent with (a)(8) of this section;

31 (5) include a process for monitoring progress and adjusting the plan

1 based on student needs;

2 (6) provide to the student's parent or guardian at least 10 reading  
3 progress updates each school year;

4 (7) be culturally responsive; and

5 (8) support the student reading at home with a parent or guardian by  
6 offering a list of adult literacy resources and organizations, providing opportunities for  
7 parent or guardian participation in training workshops, and encouraging regular parent  
8 or guardian-guided home reading activities.

9 (c) If at any time during the school year a student in grades kindergarten  
10 through three demonstrates a reading deficiency, the district or school shall notify the  
11 student's parent or guardian. The initial notification must

12 (1) be provided to the student's parent or guardian not later than 15  
13 days after identification of the reading deficiency;

14 (2) state that the district identified the student as having a reading  
15 deficiency and that a reading improvement plan will be developed under (b) of this  
16 section;

17 (3) describe current services that the district is providing to the student;

18 (4) describe the proposed evidence-based reading intervention and  
19 supplemental instructional services and supports that the district will provide to the  
20 student to improve the identified area of reading deficiency;

21 (5) explain that the district or school will inform the parent or guardian  
22 orally or in writing, as selected by the parent or guardian, of the student's progress  
23 toward grade level reading as outlined in the student's individual reading improvement  
24 plan;

25 (6) identify strategies for the parent or guardian to use at home to help  
26 the student succeed in reading;

27 (7) explain that if the student has a reading deficiency at the end of the  
28 school year and is in grades kindergarten through two, the student's progression may  
29 be delayed unless the student has previously not progressed to the next grade;

30 (8) explain that a student in grade three should demonstrate sufficient  
31 reading skills to progress to grade four under (e) of this section, unless the student

1 receives a waiver under (f) of this section or has previously not progressed to the next  
2 grade;

3 (9) explain the process and deadline to request a waiver under (f) of  
4 this section; and

5 (10) identify mid-year progression as an option for students who do  
6 not progress to the next grade.

7 (d) If it is determined, based on a statewide screening administered in the  
8 spring, that a student in grades kindergarten through two has a reading deficiency, the  
9 student's teacher and other pertinent district staff shall notify and attempt to meet with  
10 the student's parent or guardian to explain that the student will not be able to maintain  
11 adequate academic progress at the next grade level. School staff shall work with the  
12 parent or guardian to schedule a date, time, and place for the meeting, to be held not  
13 later than 45 days before the end of the school year. Following that meeting, the parent  
14 or guardian shall determine whether the student will progress to the next grade. If no  
15 parent or guardian attends the meeting or if the parent or guardian does not determine  
16 whether the student will progress to the next grade, the superintendent or the  
17 superintendent's designee shall, after considering the student's best interest and  
18 whether the student has previously not progressed to the next grade, determine  
19 whether the student will progress to the next grade.

20 (e) A student in grade three should demonstrate sufficient reading skills to  
21 progress to grade four. A student demonstrates sufficient reading skills to progress to  
22 grade four by

23 (1) scoring at grade level or higher on the statewide screening tool or  
24 on the statewide summative assessment;

25 (2) achieving an acceptable score on an alternative standardized  
26 reading screening as determined and approved by the department; or

27 (3) demonstrating mastery of reading standards through a student  
28 reading portfolio based on criteria established by the department.

29 (f) If it is determined, based on a statewide screening administered in the  
30 spring, that a student in grade three has a reading deficiency, and the student does not  
31 demonstrate sufficient reading skills to progress to grade four under (e) of this section,

1 the student's teacher and other pertinent district staff shall notify and attempt to meet  
2 with the student's parent or guardian to explain that the student is not prepared to  
3 progress to grade four. School staff shall work with the parent or guardian to schedule  
4 a date, time, and place for the meeting, to be held not later than 45 days before the end  
5 of the school year. Following that meeting, the parent or guardian may decide that the  
6 student will not progress to grade four or decide to progress the student to grade four  
7 by signing a waiver developed by the department acknowledging that the student is  
8 not prepared and agreeing that the student will participate in an additional 20 hours of  
9 individual reading improvement plan intervention services during the summer before  
10 the student enters grade four. If no parent or guardian attends the meeting or if the  
11 parent or guardian does not determine whether the student will progress to the next  
12 grade, the superintendent or the superintendent's designee shall, after considering the  
13 student's best interests and whether the student has previously not progressed to the  
14 next grade, determine whether the student will progress to grade four.

15 (g) A superintendent or superintendent's designee may exempt a student from  
16 delayed progression when progression is in the student's best interests. When  
17 determining if progression is in a student's best interests, the superintendent or  
18 superintendent's designee shall consider whether

19 (1) the student has received intensive reading intervention services for  
20 two or more years and still demonstrates a reading deficiency;

21 (2) the student's primary language is a language other than English;  
22 and

23 (3) the student has a disability and has an individualized education  
24 plan under AS 14.30.278 or a plan under 29 U.S.C. 794.

25 (h) If no parent or guardian attends the meeting, and a superintendent or  
26 superintendent's designee decides that a student in grades kindergarten through three  
27 will not progress to the next grade under (d) or (f) of this section, the district or school  
28 in which the student is enrolled shall provide immediate oral and written notification  
29 to the student's parent or guardian. The written notification must explain that the  
30 parent or guardian may reschedule the meeting provided under (d) or (f) of this section  
31 and that during a meeting



1 (1) for a student in grades kindergarten through two, the parent or  
2 guardian may decide to progress the student; and

3 (2) for a student in grade three, the parent or guardian may decide to  
4 progress the student to grade four by signing a waiver under (f) of this section.

5 (i) For a student who does not progress to the next grade under (d) or (f) of  
6 this section, or who progresses to the next grade with a waiver under (f) of this  
7 section, the district in which the student is enrolled shall

8 (1) review the student's individual reading improvement plan;

9 (2) provide intensive reading intervention services to improve the area  
10 of reading deficiency using effective instructional strategies to accelerate student  
11 progress;

12 (3) provide additional services and support to improve the student's  
13 identified area of reading deficiency, including

14 (A) a transitional instructional setting that is designed to  
15 produce learning gains;

16 (B) supplemental tutoring offered by a person with specialized  
17 reading training;

18 (C) an increase in time dedicated to the reading instruction  
19 methods described in (a)(3) - (5) of this section, including more extensive  
20 opportunities for guided practice and error correction and feedback;

21 (4) develop a plan for reading at home outlined in an agreement with  
22 the student's parent or guardian, including parent or guardian participation in training  
23 workshops and regular parent or guardian-guided home reading activities.

24 (j) For a student who does not progress to grade one, grade two, or grade three  
25 under (d) of this section, the district in which the student is enrolled shall, upon  
26 request by the student's parent or guardian, develop a plan for the student's mid-year  
27 progression.

28 (k) A school district shall adopt a policy providing for mid-year progression of  
29 a student who does not progress to grade four under (f) of this section if the student

30 (1) demonstrates sufficient reading skills to progress to grade four on  
31 the fall or winter statewide screening; and

1 (2) meets additional requirements determined by the district, including  
2 satisfactory achievement in other subject areas.

3 (l) A district shall, for the remainder of the academic year, and, if necessary,  
4 for additional school years, continue to implement an individual reading improvement  
5 plan for a student promoted mid-year under (j) or (k) of this section.

6 (m) Unless a parent or guardian decides that a student will not progress to the  
7 next grade under (d) or (f) of this section, a district or school may not delay the  
8 student's progression under this section if the student previously did not progress to  
9 the next grade.

10 (n) In this section, "reading teacher" means a teacher who

11 (1) holds a valid teacher certificate under AS 14.20;

12 (2) has demonstrated effectiveness in instructing students to read at or  
13 above grade level as measured by student reading performance data and in teacher  
14 performance evaluations; and

15 (3) meets the requirements established by the state Board of Education  
16 and Early Development in regulation.

17 **Sec. 14.30.770. Department reading program.** (a) The department shall  
18 establish a reading program to provide direct support for and intervention in intensive  
19 reading intervention services annually in the lowest-performing 25 percent of schools  
20 serving students in grades kindergarten through three as determined under  
21 AS 14.03.123. The department shall determine how many schools may be adequately  
22 served by the department's reading specialists and select schools from the lowest-  
23 performing 25 percent of schools to participate in the reading program. A school  
24 participating in the reading program that remains in the lowest-performing 25 percent  
25 of schools as determined under AS 14.03.123 may apply to participate in the reading  
26 program again in the following school year. State funding provided to participating  
27 schools for implementation of the reading program is in addition to the amount of  
28 funding provided under AS 14.17. In conducting the program, the department shall

29 (1) use the accountability system established in AS 14.03.123 to  
30 identify low performing schools;

31 (2) establish an application process for school districts to apply to

1 participate in the program;

2 (3) select low performing schools from the schools that apply to  
3 participate in the program;

4 (4) employ and assign reading specialists to direct the implementation  
5 of the intensive reading intervention services established under AS 14.30.765 by

6 (A) modeling effective instructional strategies for teachers by  
7 working regularly with students as a class, in small groups, or individually;

8 (B) coaching and mentoring teachers and staff in reading  
9 instruction with an emphasis on prioritizing time in a manner that has the  
10 greatest positive effects on student achievement;

11 (C) training teachers in data analysis and using data to  
12 differentiate instruction;

13 (D) leading and supporting reading leadership teams; and

14 (E) reporting on school and student performance to the  
15 department;

16 (5) establish a reporting process for each reading specialist to submit  
17 updates to the department on implementation of the program;

18 (6) work with reading specialists to create specific improvement goals  
19 for each school selected, including measures of interim progress;

20 (7) select and purchase additional reading material for each school  
21 selected to supplement the intensive reading intervention services;

22 (8) pay travel and associated costs for a reading specialist to attend  
23 relevant training sessions identified by or hosted by the department;

24 (9) periodically review staff development programs for their  
25 effectiveness in developing reading skills and, after consultation with school districts  
26 and experts, recommend to the board for approval staff development programs that

27 (A) have been proven to assess and accelerate student progress  
28 toward reaching reading competency;

29 (B) provide explicit and systematic skill development in the  
30 areas of phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary development, reading  
31 fluency, oral language skills, and reading comprehension;

1 (C) are evidence-based and reliable;

2 (D) provide initial and ongoing analysis of student progress

3 toward reaching reading competency; and

4 (E) include texts on core academic content to assist students in

5 maintaining or meeting grade-appropriate proficiency in academic subjects in

6 addition to reading.

7 (b) A school selected to participate in the reading program established under

8 this section shall

9 (1) ensure that a reading specialist assigned to the school is not

10 required to perform functions that divert from the duties the department has assigned

11 to the reading specialist;

12 (2) coordinate with the reading specialist or specialists to redesign the

13 school's daily schedule to dedicate time to reading program activities, including

14 intensive reading intervention services identified in a written agreement between the

15 school and the department;

16 (3) present on the reading program established under this section and

17 the intensive reading intervention services established under AS 14.30.765 at a public

18 meeting; the presentation must include

19 (A) the data the department used to identify the school as

20 eligible for the reading program;

21 (B) a detailed overview of the reading program and intensive

22 reading intervention services;

23 (C) a timeline for implementing the intensive reading

24 intervention services and meeting reading improvement goals; and

25 (D) the implications of the program for students, families, and

26 educators;

27 (4) provide notice of the public meeting required under (3) of this

28 subsection to the parent or guardian of each student at least seven days before the date

29 of the meeting;

30 (5) present an annual update on the school's implementation of the

31 reading program and intensive reading intervention services at a public meeting with

1 notice provided to the parent or guardian of each student at least seven days before the  
2 date of the meeting;

3 (6) create partnerships between the school, the families of students,  
4 and the community that focus on promoting reading and increasing the amount of time  
5 that students spend reading.

6 (c) The department shall publish on the department's Internet website and  
7 make available to the public

8 (1) a completed application from each school selected to participate in  
9 the reading program; and

10 (2) the reading program and intensive reading intervention services  
11 implemented by each school selected to participate.

12 (d) The department may employ a person as a reading specialist under this  
13 section if the person

14 (1) holds a valid teacher certificate issued under AS 14.20;

15 (2) has completed an approved graduate program at an approved  
16 institution of higher education and

17 (A) has completed a supervised practicum or internship as a  
18 reading specialist; or

19 (B) has at least three years of full-time, demonstrated  
20 classroom teaching experience where reading instruction was a primary  
21 responsibility;

22 (3) is knowledgeable about and demonstrates competency in reading  
23 instruction, including

24 (A) an understanding of phonemic awareness, phonics,  
25 vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills, and reading  
26 comprehension;

27 (B) knowledge of and experience in implementing effective  
28 reading instruction strategies and intervention methods;

29 (C) experience in designing and implementing a school-wide  
30 response to an intervention program or multi-tiered system support model;

31 (D) an understanding of and experience in reading screenings

1 and data analyses that inform instruction;

2 (E) knowledge of dyslexia and other learning disorders that  
3 affect reading achievement;

4 (F) knowledge of and an ability to effectively articulate the  
5 methods, issues, and resources involved in support of student instruction to a  
6 wide variety of audiences, including staff, parents, and students whose primary  
7 language is other than English; and

8 (4) meets other reading instruction coursework requirements  
9 established by the department in regulation, including coursework in indigenous  
10 language learning and culturally responsive education established in regulation by the  
11 department in collaboration with indigenous language stakeholders.

12 **Sec. 14.30.775. Regulation.** The department shall, by regulation, define  
13 "dyslexia" for the purposes of AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.780. The department shall  
14 consider the meaning of "dyslexia" given by the International Dyslexia Association  
15 when adopting the definition by regulation.

16 **Sec. 14.30.780. Definitions.** In AS 14.30.760 - 14.30.780,

17 (1) "district" has the meaning given in AS 14.17.990;

18 (2) "evidence-based reading intervention" means an intervention based  
19 on reliable, trustworthy, and valid evidence that has a demonstrated record of success  
20 in adequately increasing a student's reading competency in the areas of phonemic  
21 awareness, phonics, vocabulary development, reading fluency, oral language skills,  
22 and reading comprehension.

23 \* **Sec. 37.** AS 14.30 is amended by adding a new section to read:

24 **Article 16. Virtual Education.**

25 **Sec. 14.30.800. Virtual education consortium.** (a) The department shall, in  
26 cooperation with school districts, establish a virtual education consortium for the  
27 purpose of making virtual education and professional development resources available  
28 to students and teachers in the state. The department shall establish standards for  
29 consortium resources. The consortium shall create and maintain a database of virtual  
30 education courses for students, training in virtual instruction for teachers, and  
31 professional development courses for teachers of students throughout the state if the

1 coursework curriculum meets the state standards established by the department. The  
2 database must be accessible to all school districts that participate in the consortium.

3 (b) For teachers delivering or facilitating virtual coursework to students  
4 through the consortium database, the consortium shall provide training and  
5 professional development on virtual instruction methods and the differences between  
6 virtual instruction and instruction offered in a classroom. A teacher may not provide  
7 instruction through a course for students that is in the database unless

8 (1) the teacher has completed the training or professional development  
9 provided by the consortium; or

10 (2) the consortium determines that the teacher's previous experience  
11 has prepared the teacher to provide virtual instruction and the teacher demonstrates the  
12 skills necessary to provide virtual instruction.

13 (c) The consortium shall employ a reading specialist available to school  
14 districts to provide virtual intensive reading intervention services. The duties of the  
15 reading specialist include

16 (1) modeling effective instructional strategies for teachers by working  
17 regularly with students as a class, in small groups, or individually;

18 (2) coaching and mentoring teachers and staff in reading instruction  
19 with an emphasis on prioritizing time in a manner that has the greatest positive effects  
20 on student achievement;

21 (3) training teachers in data analysis and using data to differentiate  
22 instruction;

23 (4) leading and supporting reading leadership teams; and

24 (5) reporting on school and student performance to the department.

25 (d) The department may require a school district that participates in the  
26 consortium to pay a fee to the consortium. If the department requires a fee, the  
27 department shall establish the fee in regulations, based on a recommendation made by  
28 the consortium, and may adjust the fee annually as necessary. The fees must  
29 approximately equal the consortium's prorated administrative costs related to  
30 reviewing and approving courses and maintaining the database.

31 (e) A school district that provides a course included in the database may

1 charge a fee to the school district in which a student who takes the course is enrolled.  
2 The department shall establish the fee in regulations.

3 (f) The consortium may require, as a condition of participation, that school  
4 districts that provide courses or have students participating in courses included in the  
5 database under (a) of this section adopt the same school term and class schedule for all  
6 or part of a school day. The school term must meet the requirements of AS 14.03.030.

7 (g) In this section, "virtual education" or "virtual instruction" means  
8 instruction delivered through telecommunications or another digital or electronic  
9 method.

10 \* **Sec. 38.** AS 14.43.122(b) is amended to read:

11 (b) For a borrower to be eligible for consolidation of a loan under this section,  
12 the borrower must apply on a form approved by the corporation and **must** [PROVIDE  
13 PROOF SATISFACTORY TO THE CORPORATION THAT THE BORROWER]

14 (1) physically **reside** [RESIDES] in the state and **have** [HAS]  
15 maintained a domicile in the state for not less than 12 consecutive months before  
16 submitting an application for consolidation;

17 (2) **be a previous borrower, cosigner, or beneficiary of an**  
18 **education loan made under AS 14.43 or AS 14.44** [HAS NOT BEEN  
19 PHYSICALLY ABSENT FROM THE STATE FOR MORE THAN 60 DAYS IN  
20 THE 12 MONTHS BEFORE SUBMITTING AN APPLICATION FOR  
21 CONSOLIDATION]; **or**

22 (3) **be a graduate of a high school or postsecondary institution**  
23 **physically located in the state** [HAS NOT DECLARED RESIDENCY IN  
24 ANOTHER STATE];

25 (4) HAS NOT RECEIVED A BENEFIT OF RESIDENCY IN  
26 ANOTHER STATE].

27 \* **Sec. 39.** AS 14.43.173(a) is amended to read:

28 (a) In a school year, the corporation may finance a loan [TO AN ELIGIBLE  
29 BORROWER] under AS 14.43.170 - 14.43.175 **in a maximum amount to be**  
30 **determined by the corporation to an eligible** [ATTENDING AN ELIGIBLE  
31 POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION NOT TO EXCEED]



(1) [\$14,000 TO AN ELIGIBLE] undergraduate student attending an eligible [A] college or university;

(2) [\$15,000 TO AN ELIGIBLE] graduate student attending an eligible [A] college or university; and

(3) [\$10,000 TO AN ELIGIBLE] student attending an eligible [A] career education program.

\* **Sec. 40.** AS 14.43.173(b) is amended to read:

(b) The corporation may finance loans made under AS 14.43.170 - 14.43.175 to an eligible [A] borrower in a maximum total [IN AN] amount to be determined by the corporation for [THAT IS NOT MORE THAN]

(1) an [A TOTAL OF \$56,000 FOR] undergraduate study program;

(2) a [TOTAL OF \$60,000 FOR] graduate study program; and [; OR]

(3) a combined [TOTAL OF \$87,000 FOR] undergraduate and graduate study program.

\* **Sec. 41.** AS 14.43.173(d) is amended to read:

(d) The commission shall determine a borrower's loan award amount for a specific school year, which [BASED ON A STUDENT'S ON-TIME, HALF-TIME, AND FULL-TIME STUDENT STATUS AND] may not exceed the limits established by the corporation [IN THIS SECTION] or the borrower's costs of attendance.

\* **Sec. 42.** AS 14.43.175 is amended to read:

**Sec. 14.43.175. Repayment of loans.** A borrower's obligation to repay [COMMENCE REPAYMENT OF] the principal of and interest on a loan made under AS 14.43.170 - 14.43.175 begins not later [MORE] than six months following the borrower's completion or other termination of the postsecondary program or on the date [THAT] the borrower ceases to be enrolled in the program [ON] at least half time. The commission and borrower may agree to a repayment schedule that begins immediately upon disbursement of a loan [A HALF-TIME BASIS].

\* **Sec. 43.** AS 14.43.700 is amended to read:

**Sec. 14.43.700. Definition.** In AS 14.43.600 - 14.43.700, "rural" means a community with a population of 7,500 [5,500] or less that is not connected by road or rail to Anchorage or Fairbanks or a community with a population of 1,500 or less that

1 is connected by road or rail to Anchorage or Fairbanks.

2 \* **Sec. 44.** AS 14.60.010 is amended by adding new paragraphs to read:

3 (9) "culturally responsive" means showing respect for and recognition  
4 of the traditions, beliefs, languages, values, and practices of the local culture that has  
5 historically been present in the geographic area being served;

6 (10) "parent" or "guardian" includes a natural, adoptive, and foster  
7 parent, stepparent, legal guardian, relative, and other adult person with whom a  
8 student has resided and who has acted as a parent in providing for the student or has  
9 been responsible for the student's welfare for a continuous period.

10 \* **Sec. 45.** AS 47.17.290(12) is amended to read:

11 (12) "organization" means a group or entity that provides care and  
12 supervision for compensation to a child not related to the caregiver, and includes a  
13 child care facility, pre-elementary school, early education program, head start  
14 center, child foster home, residential child care facility, recreation program, children's  
15 camp, and children's club;

16 \* **Sec. 46.** AS 14.03.080(d) and 14.03.290(4) are repealed.

17 \* **Sec. 47.** AS 14.03.120(h), 14.03.410, 14.03.420; AS 14.17.500(e), 14.17.500(f),  
18 14.17.500(g); AS 14.20.020(l); AS 14.30.760, 14.30.765, 14.30.770, 14.30.775, 14.30.780,  
19 and 14.30.800 are repealed.

20 \* **Sec. 48.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
21 read:

22 VIRTUAL EDUCATION AVAILABILITY DEADLINE. The Department of  
23 Education and Early Development shall make available virtual education courses and  
24 professional development resources under sec. 36 of this Act on or before July 1, 2024.

25 \* **Sec. 49.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
26 read:

27 APPLICABILITY. Section 34 of this Act applies,

28 (1) on the effective date of sec. 34 of this Act, to teachers who begin teaching  
29 students in grades kindergarten through three on and after the effective date of sec. 34 of this  
30 Act;

31 (2) on July 1, 2024, to teachers who began teaching students in grades

1 kindergarten through three before the effective date of sec. 34 of this Act.

2 \* **Sec. 50.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
3 read:

4 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE. Not later than the thirtieth day of the First  
5 Regular Session of the Thirty-Eighth Alaska State Legislature, the Department of Education  
6 and Early Development shall prepare and present to the legislative committees having  
7 jurisdiction over education a report evaluating the virtual education consortium established  
8 under AS 14.30.800, enacted by sec. 37 of this Act, and the following programs established  
9 under this Act: the early education program, the parents as teachers program, the reading  
10 intervention program, and the department reading program. The report must include

11 (1) data analysis conducted by an independent contractor evaluating the  
12 success of each program, including

13 (A) statistics measuring the effectiveness of each program in  
14 accomplishing the program mission;

15 (B) the cost-effectiveness of each program;

16 (C) trends in reading screening scores by each group of students listed  
17 in AS 14.30.760(a)(4) as the students progress through grade eight;

18 (2) recommendations from the panels convened under AS 14.07.020(a)(19), as  
19 amended by sec. 15 of this Act; and

20 (3) recommendations from the Department of Education and Early  
21 Development addressing whether to extend, expand, contract, or repeal each program.

22 \* **Sec. 51.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
23 read:

24 TRANSITION. The number of district-wide early education programs that the  
25 department approves under AS 14.03.410, enacted by sec. 14 of this Act, in the fiscal year  
26 beginning July 1, 2022, may not result in more than \$3,000,000 of total state aid attributable  
27 to early education programs. In the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2023, the number of district-  
28 wide early education programs that the department approves may not result in an increase  
29 from the prior fiscal year of more than \$3,000,000 of total state aid attributable to early  
30 education programs.

31 \* **Sec. 52.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to

1 read:

2       TRANSITION: REGULATIONS. The Department of Education and Early  
3 Development and the state Board of Education and Early Development may adopt regulations  
4 necessary to implement the changes made by secs. 1 - 30, 32 - 36, and 43 - 50 of this Act. The  
5 regulations take effect under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act), but a regulation may  
6 not take effect before the effective date of the relevant provision of this Act implemented by  
7 the regulation.

8       \* **Sec. 53.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
9 read:

10       RETROACTIVITY. Section 43 of this Act is retroactive to January 1, 2016.

11       \* **Sec. 54.** Section 52 of this Act takes effect immediately under AS 01.10.070(c).

12       \* **Sec. 55.** Sections 31, 38 - 43, and 53 of this Act take effect July 1, 2022.

13       \* **Sec. 56.** Sections 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 20, 23, 28, 30, 33, and 47 of this Act take effect  
14 June 30, 2034.

15       \* **Sec. 57.** Except as provided in secs. 54 - 56 of this Act, this Act takes effect July 1, 2023.



INTRODUCTION TO

# Alaska's Strategic Reading Plan

August 30, 2022  
Version 1.0

Contacts:

**Susan McKenzie**

Director, Division of Innovation and Education Excellence  
Alaska Department of Education and Early Development

Ph: 907-269-4583

Cell: 907-500-8594

[Susan.McKenzie@alaska.gov](mailto:Susan.McKenzie@alaska.gov)

**Grant Robinson**

Public Information Officer

Alaska Department of Education and Early Development

Ph: 907-500-4983

[Grant.Robinson@alaska.gov](mailto:Grant.Robinson@alaska.gov)

## Introduction to Alaska's Strategic Reading Plan

Alaska's *Strategic Reading Plan* outlines the path to meeting the top priority of Alaska's Education Challenge: support all students to read at grade level by the end of third grade. The plan encompasses all efforts of the Alaska Department of Education and Early Development to provide information, resources and leadership that work toward achieving Alaska's reading goal. The Strategic Reading Plan is how DEED's mission and purpose are manifest in alignment with Priority #1 of Alaska's Education Challenge. While DEED's focus in *Strategic Reading Plan* is to provide support to schools so that all students read at grade level by the end of third grade, **support is provided for all grades**




Figure 1: The *Strategic Reading Plan* is how DEED's mission and purpose are manifest in support of Priority #1 of Alaska's Education Challenge.

The *Strategic Reading Plan* is arranged in six strategies :

1. Professional Development
2. Evidence-Based Materials
3. Early Literacy
4. Frameworks for Success
5. Science of Reading (SOR) Resources, Data and Communication
6. Teacher Preparation

The Plan is a living document. It contains all current activities and resources in each strategy area and will be updated regularly as new opportunities are available. Additionally, the Plan will serve as a record to document all of DEED's efforts to improve literacy outcomes. This will facilitate evaluating the effectiveness of the Plan, and also produce a comprehensive historical account of Alaska's reading improvement.

## Incorporating the *Alaska Reads Act* into the Plan

In June, Governor Mike Dunleavy signed the *Alaska Reads Act*, which creates four new programs and additional data collection requirements geared toward students from Pre-K through third grade. All elements of the *Alaska Reads Act* are incorporated into the *Reading Plan*.




Figure 2. The four programs and data reporting requirements created by the *Alaska Reads Act* are embedded within the *Strategic Reading Plan*.

## Components of the Strategic Reading Plan (Through September 1, 2022)

### Strategy 1: Professional Development

- Alaska's Reading Playbook Webinar Series
- Supporting Effective Literacy Instruction Class
- Alaska Science of Reading Academy for Leaders Class
- LETRS Class: Teacher, Administrators, Early Learning
- 2023 Alaska Science of Reading Symposium
- Assessment Literacy

### Strategy 2: Evidence-Based Materials

- Curriculum adoption Initiative
- Alaska's Reading Playbook
- Heggerty Phonemic Awareness
- Phonics for Reading

- CORE Reading Sourcebook
- CORE Multiple Measures
- *Reads Act* intervention materials\*
- UFLI Foundation: SOR Teacher Resource Book

### *Strategy 3: Early Learning*

- Secure, implement and provide training for a state-wide literacy screener with progress monitor and dyslexia screener\*
- Train and implement Teaching Strategies Gold Assessment to Pre-K and Head Start Programs
- *Reads Act* Early Education Programs\*
- *Reads Act* Parents as Teachers Program\*
- Update Alaska Developmental Profile

### *Strategy 4: Frameworks for Success*

- Professional Learning Communities
- Multi-Tiered Systems of Support (includes *Reads Act* RTI/MTSS approval process)\*
- Positive Behavior Intervention and Supports
- Academic Support Team
- Update the Alaska Literacy Blueprint
- Implement *Reads Act* Advisory Panel\*
- *Reads Act* Department Reading Program\*
- *Reads Act* Virtual Education Consortium\*

### *Strategy 5: Science of Reading Resources, Data and Communication*

- Develop reading resource webpage on AKLearns.org and DEED website to include standards, resources, and professional development
- Monthly Alaska Reading Newsletter
- Reading communications through multiple sources (social media, legacy media)
- *Reads Act* reporting and data collection\*
- Website for *Reads Act* specific information\*

### *Strategy 6: Teacher Preparation*

- 
- Reading Endorsement through micro-credentialing
- *Reads Act* Pre-K Teacher Preparation\*
- Tiered Pathways for *Reads Act* K-3 Teacher Training\*

*\*Denotes requirement or direct support of requirement of the Alaska Reads Act*





# **LAWS OF ALASKA**

**2022**

**Source**

HCS CSSB 20(EDC)

**Chapter No.**

\_\_\_\_\_

**AN ACT**

Relating to teaching certificates for teachers holding out-of-state certificates.

\_\_\_\_\_

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

THE ACT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 1



## AN ACT

1 Relating to teaching certificates for teachers holding out-of-state certificates.

2  
3 \* **Section 1.** AS 14.20.010 is amended to read:

4           **Sec. 14.20.010. Teacher certificate required.** A person may not be employed  
5 as a teacher in the public schools of the state unless that person possesses a valid  
6 teacher certificate except that a person who has made application to the department for  
7 a teacher certificate [, INCLUDING A PRELIMINARY TEACHER CERTIFICATE  
8 UNDER AS 14.20.015,] or renewal of a teacher certificate that has not been acted **on**  
9 [UPON] by the department may be employed as a teacher in the public schools of the  
10 state until the department has taken action on the application, but in no case may  
11 employment without a certificate last longer than three months. A person who has  
12 made application for a certificate under this section may teach for an additional 60  
13 days beyond three months without a certificate if the department grants a written  
14 extension. An extension may be granted under this section for not more than 60 days  
15 to the person solely due to delay in the department's receipt of criminal justice

1 information under AS 12.62 or a national criminal history record check under  
2 AS 12.62.400.

3 \* **Sec. 2.** AS 14.20.015(a) is amended to read:

4 (a) **Notwithstanding the requirements of AS 14.20.020, the** [THE]  
5 department shall issue a [PRELIMINARY] teacher certificate to an out-of-state  
6 teacher who meets the requirements of this section. To be eligible for a  
7 [PRELIMINARY] teacher certificate **under this section**, a person shall

8 (1) have received at least a baccalaureate degree from an institution of  
9 higher education accredited by a recognized regional accrediting association or  
10 approved by the commissioner;

11 (2) hold a valid **regular** teacher certificate issued by another state;

12 (3) have submitted fingerprints to the department to be used for a  
13 criminal history background check and been found by the department to be suitable for  
14 employment as a teacher under AS 14.20.020(f);

15 (4) have paid the fee required by the department under  
16 AS 14.20.020(c).

17 \* **Sec. 3.** AS 14.20.015(b) is amended to read:

18 (b) An out-of-state teacher who has been issued a [PRELIMINARY] teacher  
19 certificate under this section shall **complete the education requirements under**  
20 **AS 14.20.020(h) within two years, and complete the training requirements under**  
21 **AS 14.20.020(k) within 90 days**, [PASS THE COMPETENCY EXAMINATION  
22 DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD UNDER AS 14.20.020(i) WITHIN ONE YEAR]  
23 after the date the [PRELIMINARY] teacher certificate was issued. If the teacher does  
24 not **complete the education requirements within that two-year period or the**  
25 **training requirements within that 90-day period** [PASS THE EXAMINATION],  
26 the department shall immediately revoke the teacher's [PRELIMINARY] teacher  
27 certificate.

28 \* **Sec. 4.** AS 14.20.015(c) is amended to read:

29 (c) The [PRELIMINARY] teacher certificate issued under this section must  
30 contain the same endorsements as those on the current valid **regular** teacher certificate  
31 issued by the other state.

1     \* **Sec. 5.** AS 14.20.015 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

2             (g) The department shall by regulation adopt a process to expedite issuance of  
3             a certificate to the spouse of an active duty member of the armed forces of the United  
4             States.

5     \* **Sec. 6.** AS 14.20.020(h) is amended to read:

6             (h) **Except as provided in AS 14.20.015, a** [A] person is not eligible for a  
7             teacher certificate unless the person has completed three semester hours in Alaska  
8             studies and three semester hours in multicultural education or cross-cultural  
9             communications. However, the commissioner may issue a provisional certificate, valid  
10            for no longer than two years, to an applicant who has not completed the semester  
11            hours required under this subsection at the time of application.

12    \* **Sec. 7.** AS 14.20.020(k) is amended to read:

13            (k) **Except as provided in AS 14.20.015, a** [A] person is not eligible for a  
14            teacher certificate unless the person has completed training regarding alcohol and drug  
15            related disabilities required under AS 14.20.680, training regarding sexual abuse and  
16            sexual assault awareness and prevention required under AS 14.30.355, training  
17            regarding dating violence and abuse awareness and prevention required under  
18            AS 14.30.356, and training related to suicide prevention required under AS 14.30.362.

19    \* **Sec. 8.** AS 14.20.015(d), 14.20.015(e), and 14.20.015(f) are repealed.



# LAWS OF ALASKA

**2022**

**Source**  
CSHB 19(EDC)

**Chapter No.**  
\_\_\_\_\_

## **AN ACT**

Relating to instruction in a language other than English; and establishing limited language immersion teacher certificates.

\_\_\_\_\_

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

THE ACT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 1



## AN ACT

1 Relating to instruction in a language other than English; and establishing limited language  
2 immersion teacher certificates.

3  
4 \* **Section 1.** AS 14.20 is amended by adding a new section to read:

5 **Sec. 14.20.023. Limited language immersion teacher certificates.** (a)

6 Notwithstanding AS 14.20.020(b), the department may issue a limited language  
7 immersion teacher certificate, valid only in the area of expertise for which it is issued,  
8 to a person qualified under (b) of this section to teach any subject if the language of  
9 instruction is not English and the instruction is provided only to students who are  
10 enrolled in a language immersion program.

11 (b) A person may apply for a limited language immersion teacher certificate  
12 under this section if the person is the subject of a request made under (c) of this  
13 section and demonstrates, as required by regulations adopted by the board,  
14 instructional skills and subject matter expertise sufficient to assure the public that the



1 person is competent as a teacher. The board may require a person issued a limited  
2 language immersion teacher certificate under this section to undertake academic  
3 training as may be required by the board by regulation and make satisfactory progress  
4 in the academic training.

5 (c) The department may issue a limited language immersion teacher certificate  
6 under this section if the school board of the district or regional educational attendance  
7 area in which an applicant for a limited language immersion teacher certificate will be  
8 teaching submits a request to the department for the limited language immersion  
9 teacher certificate to be issued to the applicant. A request for a limited language  
10 immersion teacher certificate under this section must specify the school district or  
11 regional educational attendance area, subject, and instructional language for which the  
12 certificate is valid.

13 (d) The board may adopt regulations necessary to implement this section. The  
14 regulations may not require an applicant for a limited language immersion teacher  
15 certificate under this section to achieve a minimum score on an examination unless the  
16 examination is given in the instructional language for which the certificate is valid.

17 (e) A limited language immersion teacher certificate issued under this section  
18 is initially valid for one year. The department may, in accordance with regulations  
19 adopted by the board, extend or renew a limited language immersion teacher  
20 certificate issued to a person under this section if the school board of the district or  
21 regional educational attendance area in which the person is or will be teaching  
22 requests that the certificate be extended or renewed and certifies that the person has  
23 demonstrated skills in classroom instruction and student assessment.



# LAWS OF ALASKA

2022

**Source**

CSHB 53(MLV) am(efd add)

**Chapter No.**

\_\_\_\_\_

**AN ACT**

Relating to residency requirements for public school enrollment for certain children of active duty military and National Guard members; and providing for an effective date.

\_\_\_\_\_

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

THE ACT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 1



## AN ACT

1 Relating to residency requirements for public school enrollment for certain children of active  
2 duty military and National Guard members; and providing for an effective date.

3  
4 \* **Section 1.** AS 14.03.080 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

5 (g) A school district shall consider a student to be a resident of the district and  
6 admit the student to a public school in the district if a parent or guardian of the student  
7 is serving as an active duty member of the armed forces of the United States or a  
8 member of the National Guard and is transferred or pending transfer under an official  
9 military order to a military installation in the state from another military installation in  
10 the state or from outside of the state. A parent or guardian of the student shall provide  
11 to the school district written proof of residence in the state on an official document  
12 within 30 days of the student's first day of attendance in the school district. In this  
13 subsection,

- 1                               (1) "guardian" has the meaning given in AS 13.06.050;
- 2                               (2) "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard,
- 3                               center, homeport facility for a ship, armory, or other installation under the jurisdiction
- 4                               of the United States Department of Defense or the United States Coast Guard;
- 5                               (3) "residence" means the principal dwelling place of an active duty
- 6                               parent or guardian.
- 7       \* **Sec. 2.** This Act takes effect immediately under AS 01.10.070(c).



# LAWS OF ALASKA

**2022**

**Source**

HCS CSSB 34(TRB)

**Chapter No.**

\_\_\_\_\_

**AN ACT**

Relating to a demonstration state-tribal education compact; relating to demonstration state-tribal education compact schools; and providing for an effective date.

\_\_\_\_\_

**BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:**

THE ACT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 1



## AN ACT

1 Relating to a demonstration state-tribal education compact; relating to demonstration state-  
2 tribal education compact schools; and providing for an effective date.

3  
4 \* **Section 1.** The uncoded law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section  
5 to read:

6 DEMONSTRATION STATE-TRIBAL EDUCATION COMPACT. (a) The state  
7 Board of Education and Early Development shall negotiate a demonstration state-tribal  
8 education compact with federally recognized tribes and tribal organizations in the state to  
9 establish demonstration state-tribal education compact schools. The demonstration state-tribal  
10 education compact may be for a term of not more than five years and may not include more  
11 than five demonstration state-tribal education compact schools.

12 (b) A governing body of a federally recognized tribe may initiate the negotiation  
13 described in (a) of this section by submitting to the board, on or before December 31, 2022, a



1 resolution that requests negotiation under (a) of this section and that identifies the tribal  
2 organizations, if any, that will participate in the negotiation on behalf of or in conjunction  
3 with the federally recognized tribe.

4 (c) Not later than March 31, 2023, the board shall meet with the governing bodies of  
5 the federally recognized tribes that submitted a resolution under (b) of this section and any  
6 tribal organization identified in the resolution by the federally recognized tribe and negotiate  
7 the terms of the demonstration state-tribal education compact. For each school district that  
8 will have a demonstration state-tribal education compact school located within the school  
9 district's boundaries, the board shall consult with

10 (1) the governing body of the school district; and

11 (2) a representative of the collective bargaining unit that represents the  
12 teachers of the school district.

13 (d) Not later than January 31, 2024, the board shall submit a report containing  
14 recommendations to the legislature relating to the demonstration state-tribal education  
15 compact and demonstration state-tribal education compact schools. The board may include in  
16 the report proposed legislation relating to the demonstration state-tribal education compact  
17 and demonstration state-tribal education compact schools. The board shall submit the report to  
18 the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the  
19 legislature that the report is available. The board shall consult with the federally recognized  
20 tribes and tribal organizations that will be a party to the demonstration state-tribal education  
21 compact before submitting the report required under this subsection.

22 (e) In this section, "board" means the state Board of Education and Early  
23 Development.

24 \* **Sec. 2.** The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to  
25 read:

26 **CONDITIONAL EFFECT: DEMONSTRATION STATE-TRIBAL EDUCATION**  
27 **COMPACT.** A demonstration state-tribal education compact negotiated under sec. 1(a) of this  
28 Act takes effect only after enactment into law on or before June 30, 2026, of a bill authorizing  
29 the demonstration state-tribal education compact and demonstration state-tribal education  
30 compact schools.

31 \* **Sec. 3.** This Act takes effect immediately under AS 01.10.070(c).

## Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

## Syllabus

KENNEDY *v.* BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICTCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–418. Argued April 25, 2022—Decided June 27, 2022

Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in the Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet personal prayer. Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District’s actions violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. He also moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties engaged in discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that the “sole reason” for the District’s decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived “risk of constitutional liability” under the Establishment Clause for his “religious conduct” after three games in October 2015. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231. The District Court granted summary judgment to the District and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911. Several dissenters argued that the panel applied a flawed understanding of the Establishment Clause reflected in *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U. S. 602, and that this Court has abandoned *Lemon*’s “ahistorical, atextual” approach to discerning Establishment Clause violations. 4 F. 4th, at 911, and n. 3.

*Held:* The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Pp. 11–32.

(a) Mr. Kennedy contends that the District’s conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious

## Syllabus

activities. See, e.g., *Widmar v. Vincent*, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6. A plaintiff must demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries his or her burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless justified and appropriately tailored. Pp. 11–30.

(1) Mr. Kennedy discharged his burden under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s precedents permit a plaintiff to demonstrate a free exercise violation multiple ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, 494 U. S. 872, 879–881. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, under which the government must demonstrate its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. See, e.g., *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah*, 508 U. S. 520, 546.

Here, no one questions that Mr. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise involving giving “thanks through prayer” briefly “on the playing field” at the conclusion of each game he coaches. App. 168, 171. The contested exercise here does not involve leading prayers with the team; the District disciplined Mr. Kennedy *only* for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his students after three games in October 2015. In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s brief prayer, the District’s challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy’s actions at least in part because of their religious character. Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District’s unquestioned “object.” The District explained that it could not allow an on-duty employee to engage in *religious* conduct even though it allowed other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct. The District’s performance evaluation after the 2015 football season also advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he failed to supervise student-athletes after games, but any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded way. Pp. 12–14. The District thus conceded that its policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable.

(2) Mr. Kennedy also discharged his burden under the Free Speech Clause. The First Amendment’s protections extend to “teachers and students,” neither of whom “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.*, 393 U. S. 503, 506. But teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part to speak on the government’s behalf and to convey its intended mes-

## Syllabus

sages. To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court’s decisions in *Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.*, 391 U. S. 563, and *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U. S. 410, and related cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. When an employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” the Court’s cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. *Id.*, at 423. At this step, courts should engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.” *Ibid.* At the first step of the *Pickering–Garcetti* inquiry, the parties’ disagreement centers on one question: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District?

When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach. *Lane v. Franks*, 573 U. S. 228, 240. He did not speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy’s prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy’s responsibilities as a public employee. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 421. The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirms that Mr. Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. It is not dispositive that Coach Kennedy served as a role model and remained on duty after games. To hold otherwise is to posit an “excessively broad job description” by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 424. That Mr. Kennedy used available time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech. Acknowledging that Mr. Kennedy’s prayers represented his own private speech means he has carried his threshold burden. Under the *Pickering–Garcetti* framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove that its interests as employer outweigh even an employee’s private speech on a matter of public concern. See *Lane*, 573 U. S., at 242. Pp. 15–19.

(3) Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally

## Syllabus

must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See *Lukumi*, 508 U. S., at 533. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 576 U. S. 155, 171. The District asks the Court to apply to Mr. Kennedy’s claims the more lenient second-step *Pickering–Garcetti* test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. The Court concludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under any standard. Pp. 19–30.

i. The District, like the Ninth Circuit below, insists Mr. Kennedy’s rights to religious exercise and free speech must yield to the District’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under *Lemon* and its progeny. The *Lemon* approach called for an examination of a law’s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with religion. *Lemon*, 403 U. S., at 612–613. In time, that approach also came to involve estimations about whether a “reasonable observer” would consider the government’s challenged action an “endorsement” of religion. See, e.g., *County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter*, 492 U. S. 573, 593. But—given the apparent “shortcomings” associated with *Lemon*’s “ambitiou[s],” abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause—this Court long ago abandoned *Lemon* and its endorsement test offshoot. *American Legion v. American Humanist Assn.*, 588 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (plurality opinion).

In place of *Lemon* and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “reference to historical practices and understandings.” *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 572 U. S. 565, 576. A natural reading of the First Amendment suggests that the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. *Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing*, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15. An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some “exception” within the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” *Town of Greece*, at 575. The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance. Pp. 19–30.

ii. The District next attempts to justify its suppression of Mr. Kennedy’s religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would coerce students to pray. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceedings below and evidence of coercion in this record is absent. The District suggests that *any* visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students. A rule that the only acceptable gov-

## Syllabus

ernment role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always been “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.” *Lee v. Weisman*, 505 U. S. 577, 590. No historically sound understanding of the Establishment Clause begins to “mak[e] it necessary for government to be hostile to religion” in this way. *Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U. S. 306, 314. Pp. 24–30.

iii. There is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case. There is only the “mere shadow” of a conflict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. *School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203, 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). A government entity’s concerns about phantom constitutional violations do not justify actual violations of an individual’s First Amendment rights. Pp. 30–31.

(c) Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a personal religious observance, based on a mistaken view that it has a duty to suppress religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his religious exercise and free speech claims. Pp. 31–32.

991 F. 3d 1004, reversed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, except as to Part III–B. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed concurring opinions. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

---

No. 21–418

---

JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER *v.*  
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach because he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet prayer of thanks. Mr. Kennedy prayed during a period when school employees were free to speak with a friend, call for a reservation at a restaurant, check email, or attend to other personal matters. He offered his prayers quietly while his students were otherwise occupied. Still, the Bremerton School District disciplined him anyway. It did so because it thought anything less could lead a reasonable observer to conclude (mistakenly) that it endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s religious beliefs. That reasoning was misguided. Both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect expressions like Mr. Kennedy’s. Nor does a proper understanding of the Amendment’s Establishment Clause require the government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike.

## Opinion of the Court

## I

## A

Joseph Kennedy began working as a football coach at Bremerton High School in 2008 after nearly two decades of service in the Marine Corps. App. 167. Like many other football players and coaches across the country, Mr. Kennedy made it a practice to give “thanks through prayer on the playing field” at the conclusion of each game. *Id.*, at 168, 171. In his prayers, Mr. Kennedy sought to express gratitude for “what the players had accomplished and for the opportunity to be part of their lives through the game of football.” *Id.*, at 168. Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying “quiet[ly]” for “approximately 30 seconds.” *Id.*, at 168–169.

Initially, Mr. Kennedy prayed on his own. See *ibid.* But over time, some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. 991 F. 3d 1004, 1010 (CA9 2021); App. 169. Mr. Kennedy responded by saying, “This is a free country. You can do what you want.” *Ibid.* The number of players who joined Mr. Kennedy eventually grew to include most of the team, at least after some games. Sometimes team members invited opposing players to join. Other times Mr. Kennedy still prayed alone. See *ibid.* Eventually, Mr. Kennedy began incorporating short motivational speeches with his prayer when others were present. See *id.*, at 170. Separately, the team at times engaged in pregame or postgame prayers in the locker room. It seems this practice was a “school tradition” that predated Mr. Kennedy’s tenure. *Ibid.* Mr. Kennedy explained that he “never told any student that it was important they participate in any religious activity.” *Ibid.* In particular, he “never pressured or encouraged any student to join” his postgame midfield prayers. *Ibid.*

For over seven years, no one complained to the Bremerton School District (District) about these practices. See *id.*,



## Opinion of the Court

at 63–64. It seems the District’s superintendent first learned of them only in September 2015, after an employee from another school commented positively on the school’s practices to Bremerton’s principal. See *id.*, at 109, 229. At that point, the District reacted quickly. On September 17, the superintendent sent Mr. Kennedy a letter. In it, the superintendent identified “two problematic practices” in which Mr. Kennedy had engaged. App. 40. First, Mr. Kennedy had provided “inspirational talk[s]” that included “overtly religious references” likely constituting “prayer” with the students “at midfield following the completion of . . . game[s].” *Ibid.* Second, he had led “students and coaching staff in a prayer” in the locker-room tradition that “pre-dated [his] involvement with the program.” *Id.*, at 41.

The District explained that it sought to establish “clear parameters” “going forward.” *Ibid.* It instructed Mr. Kennedy to avoid any motivational “talks with students” that “include[d] religious expression, including prayer,” and to avoid “suggest[ing], encourag[ing] (or discourag[ing]), or supervis[ing]” any prayers of students, which students remained free to “engage in.” *Id.*, at 44. The District also explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedy’s part must be “nondemonstrative (*i.e.*, not outwardly discernible as religious activity)” if “students are also engaged in religious conduct” in order to “avoid the perception of endorsement.” *Id.*, at 45. In offering these directives, the District appealed to what it called a “direct tension between” the “Establishment Clause” and “a school employee’s [right to] free[ly] exercise” his religion. *Id.*, at 43. To resolve that “tension,” the District explained, an employee’s free exercise rights “must yield so far as necessary to avoid school endorsement of religious activities.” *Ibid.*

After receiving the District’s September 17 letter, Mr. Kennedy ended the tradition, predating him, of offering locker-room prayers. *Id.*, at 40–41, 77, 170–172. He also ended his practice of incorporating religious references or

## Opinion of the Court

prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the field. See *ibid.* Mr. Kennedy further felt pressured to abandon his practice of saying his own quiet, on-field post-game prayer. See *id.*, at 172. Driving home after a game, however, Mr. Kennedy felt upset that he had “broken [his] commitment to God” by not offering his own prayer, so he turned his car around and returned to the field. *Ibid.* By that point, everyone had left the stadium, and he walked to the 50-yard line and knelt to say a brief prayer of thanks. See *ibid.*

On October 14, through counsel, Mr. Kennedy sent a letter to school officials informing them that, because of his “sincerely-held religious beliefs,” he felt “compelled” to offer a “post-game personal prayer” of thanks at midfield. *Id.*, at 62–63, 172. He asked the District to allow him to continue that “private religious expression” alone. *Id.*, at 62. Consistent with the District’s policy, see *id.*, at 48, Mr. Kennedy explained that he “neither requests, encourages, nor discourages students from participating in” these prayers, *id.*, at 64. Mr. Kennedy emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to “wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the field and then wal[k] to mid-field to say a short, private, personal prayer.” *Id.*, at 69. He “told everybody” that it would be acceptable to him to pray “when the kids went away from [him].” *Id.*, at 292. He later clarified that this meant he was even willing to say his “prayer while the players were walking to the locker room” or “bus,” and then catch up with his team. *Id.*, at 280–282; see also *id.*, at 59. However, Mr. Kennedy objected to the logical implication of the District’s September 17 letter, which he understood as banning him “from bowing his head” in the vicinity of students, and as requiring him to “flee the scene if students voluntarily [came] to the same area” where he was praying. *Id.*, at 70. After all, District policy prohibited him from “discourag[ing]” independent student decisions to pray. *Id.*, at 44.

## Opinion of the Court

On October 16, shortly before the game that day, the District responded with another letter. See *id.*, at 76. The District acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the “directives” in its September 17 letter. *Id.*, at 77. Yet instead of accommodating Mr. Kennedy’s request to offer a brief prayer on the field while students were busy with other activities—whether heading to the locker room, boarding the bus, or perhaps singing the school fight song—the District issued an ultimatum. It forbade Mr. Kennedy from engaging in “any overt actions” that could “appea[r] to a reasonable observer to endorse . . . prayer . . . while he is on duty as a District-paid coach.” *Id.*, at 81. The District did so because it judged that anything less would lead it to violate the Establishment Clause. *Ibid.*

## B

After receiving this letter, Mr. Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game. See *id.*, at 90. When he bowed his head at midfield after the game, “most [Bremerton] players were . . . engaged in the traditional singing of the school fight song to the audience.” *Ibid.* Though Mr. Kennedy was alone when he began to pray, players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished his prayer. See *id.*, at 82, 297.

This event spurred media coverage of Mr. Kennedy’s dilemma and a public response from the District. The District placed robocalls to parents to inform them that public access to the field is forbidden; it posted signs and made announcements at games saying the same thing; and it had the Bremerton Police secure the field in future games. *Id.*, at 100–101, 354–355. Subsequently, the District superintendent explained in an October 20 email to the leader of a state association of school administrators that “the coach moved on from leading prayer with kids, to taking a silent prayer at the 50 yard line.” *Id.*, at 83. The official with whom the superintendent corresponded acknowledged that

## Opinion of the Court

the “use of a silent prayer changes the equation a bit.” *Ibid.* On October 21, the superintendent further observed to a state official that “[t]he issue is quickly changing as it has shifted from leading prayer with student athletes, to a coaches [*sic*] right to conduct” his own prayer “on the 50 yard line.” *Id.*, at 88.

On October 23, shortly before that evening’s game, the District wrote Mr. Kennedy again. It expressed “appreciation” for his “efforts to comply” with the District’s directives, including avoiding “on-the-job prayer with players in the . . . football program, both in the locker room prior to games as well as on the field immediately following games.” *Id.*, at 90. The letter also admitted that, during Mr. Kennedy’s recent October 16 postgame prayer, his students were otherwise engaged and not praying with him, and that his prayer was “fleeting.” *Id.*, at 90, 93. Still, the District explained that a “reasonable observer” could think government endorsement of religion had occurred when a “District employee, on the field only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty” engaged in “overtly religious conduct.” *Id.*, at 91, 93. The District thus made clear that the only option it would offer Mr. Kennedy was to allow him to pray after a game in a “private location” behind closed doors and “not observable to students or the public.” *Id.*, at 93–94.

After the October 23 game ended, Mr. Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line, where “no one joined him,” and bowed his head for a “brief, quiet prayer.” 991 F. 3d, at 1019; App. 173, 236–239. The superintendent informed the District’s board that this prayer “moved closer to what we want,” but nevertheless remained “unconstitutional.” *Id.*, at 96. After the final relevant football game on October 26, Mr. Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231 (WD Wash. 2020); App. to Pet. for Cert. 182. While he was praying, other adults gathered around him on the field. See

## Opinion of the Court

443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 97. Later, Mr. Kennedy rejoined his players for a postgame talk, after they had finished singing the school fight song. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 103.

## C

Shortly after the October 26 game, the District placed Mr. Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from “participat[ing], in any capacity, in . . . football program activities.” *Ibid.* In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action, the superintendent criticized Mr. Kennedy for engaging in “public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach” by offering a prayer following the games on October 16, 23, and 26. *Id.*, at 102. The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities. *Id.*, at 103. Additionally, the letter faulted Mr. Kennedy for not being willing to pray behind closed doors. *Id.*, at 102.

In an October 28 Q&A document provided to the public, the District admitted that it possessed “no evidence that students have been directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.” *Id.*, at 105. The Q&A also acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the District’s instruction to refrain from his “prior practices of leading players in a pre-game prayer in the locker room or leading players in a post-game prayer immediately following games.” *Ibid.* But the Q&A asserted that the District could not allow Mr. Kennedy to “engage in a public religious display.” *Id.*, at 105, 107, 110. Otherwise, the District would “violat[e] the . . . Establishment Clause” because “reasonable . . . students and attendees” might perceive the “district [as] endors[ing] . . . religion.” *Id.*, at 105.

While Mr. Kennedy received “uniformly positive evaluations” every other year of his coaching career, after the 2015

## Opinion of the Court

season ended in November, the District gave him a poor performance evaluation. *Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.*, 869 F. 3d 813, 820 (CA9 2017). The evaluation advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the grounds that he “‘failed to follow district policy’” regarding religious expression and “‘failed to supervise student-athletes after games.’” *Ibid.* Mr. Kennedy did not return for the next season. *Ibid.*

## II

## A

After these events, Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District’s actions violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. App. 145, 160–164. He also moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion, concluding that a “reasonable observer . . . would have seen him as . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 303. Indeed, if the District had not suspended him, the court agreed, it might have violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. See *id.*, at 302–303. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. *Kennedy*, 869 F. 3d, at 831.

Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, Mr. Kennedy sought certiorari in this Court. The Court denied the petition. But JUSTICE ALITO, joined by three other Members of the Court, issued a statement stressing that “denial of certiorari does not signify that the Court necessarily agrees with the decision . . . below.” *Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.*, 586 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2019) (slip op., at 1). JUSTICE ALITO expressed concerns with the lower courts’ decisions, including the possibility that, under their reasoning, teachers might be “ordered not to engage in any ‘demonstrative’ conduct of a religious nature” within view of students, even to the point of being forbidden from “folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer” before lunch. *Id.*, at \_\_\_

## Opinion of the Court

(slip op., at 4).

## B

After the case returned to the District Court, the parties engaged in discovery and eventually brought cross-motions for summary judgment. At the end of that process, the District Court found that the “sole reason” for the District’s decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived “risk of constitutional liability” under the Establishment Clause for his “religious conduct” after the October 16, 23, and 26 games. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231.

The court found that reason persuasive too. Rejecting Mr. Kennedy’s free speech claim, the court concluded that because Mr. Kennedy “was hired precisely to occupy” an “influential role for student athletes,” any speech he uttered was offered in his capacity as a government employee and unprotected by the First Amendment. *Id.*, at 1237. Alternatively, even if Mr. Kennedy’s speech qualified as private speech, the District Court reasoned, the District properly suppressed it. Had it done otherwise, the District would have invited “an Establishment Clause violation.” *Ibid.* Turning to Mr. Kennedy’s free exercise claim, the District Court held that, even if the District’s policies restricting his religious exercise were not neutral toward religion or generally applicable, the District had a compelling interest in prohibiting his postgame prayers, because, once more, had it “allow[ed]” them it “would have violated the Establishment Clause.” *Id.*, at 1240.

## C

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with the District Court that Mr. Kennedy’s speech qualified as government rather than private speech because “his expression on the field—a location that he only had access to because of his employment—during a time when he was generally tasked

## Opinion of the Court

with communicating with students, was speech as a government employee.” 991 F.3d, at 1015. Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit further reasoned that, “even if we were to assume . . . that Kennedy spoke as a private citizen,” the District had an “adequate justification” for its actions. *Id.*, at 1016. According to the court, “Kennedy’s on-field religious activity,” coupled with what the court called “his pugilistic efforts to generate publicity in order to gain approval of those on-field religious activities,” were enough to lead an “objective observer” to conclude that the District “endorsed Kennedy’s religious activity by not stopping the practice.” *Id.*, at 1017–1018. And that, the court held, would amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause. *Ibid.*

The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Kennedy’s free exercise claim for similar reasons. The District “concede[d]” that its policy that led to Mr. Kennedy’s suspension was not “neutral and generally applicable” and instead “restrict[ed] Kennedy’s religious conduct because the conduct [was] religious.” *Id.*, at 1020. Still, the court ruled, the District “had a compelling state interest to avoid violating the Establishment Clause,” and its suspension was narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest. *Id.*, at 1020–1021.

Later, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911 (2021). Among other things, the dissenters argued that the panel erred by holding that a failure to discipline Mr. Kennedy would have led the District to violate the Establishment Clause. Several dissenters noted that the panel’s analysis rested on *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and its progeny for the proposition that the Establishment Clause is implicated whenever a hypothetical reasonable observer could conclude the government endorses religion. 4 F. 4th, at 945–947 (opinion of R. Nelson, J.). These dissenters argued that this Court has long since



## Opinion of the Court

abandoned that “ahistorical, atextual” approach to discerning “Establishment Clause violations”; they observed that other courts around the country have followed suit by renouncing it too; and they contended that the panel should have likewise “recognized *Lemon*’s demise and wisely left it dead.” *Ibid.*, and n. 3. We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2022).

## III

Now before us, Mr. Kennedy renews his argument that the District’s conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. These Clauses work in tandem. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities. See, e.g., *Widmar v. Vincent*, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6 (1981); *Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.*, 515 U. S. 819, 841 (1995). That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no accident. It is a natural outgrowth of the framers’ distrust of government attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent. See, e.g., A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in *Selected Writings of James Madison* 21, 25 (R. Ketcham ed. 2006). “[I]n Anglo–American history, . . . government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed *precisely* at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.” *Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette*, 515 U. S. 753, 760 (1995).

Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff bears certain burdens to demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries these burdens, the focus then shifts to the defendant to show that its actions were nonetheless justified and tailored consistent with the demands of our case law. See, e.g., *Fulton v. Philadelphia*, 593 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_–\_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2021)

## Opinion of the Court

(slip op., at 4–5, 13); *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 576 U. S. 155, 171 (2015); *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006); *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah*, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993); *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963). We begin by examining whether Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens, first under the Free Exercise Clause, then under the Free Speech Clause.

## A

The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1. This Court has held the Clause applicable to the States under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). The Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly. It does perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through “the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.” *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).

Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” *Id.*, at 879–881. Should a plaintiff make a showing like that, this Court will find a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy “strict scrutiny” by demonstrating its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. *Lukumi*, 508 U. S., at 546.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>A plaintiff may also prove a free exercise violation by showing that “official expressions of hostility” to religion accompany laws or policies burdening religious exercise; in cases like that we have “set aside” such policies without further inquiry. *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado*

## Opinion of the Court

That Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens is effectively undisputed. No one questions that he seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise. The exercise in question involves, as Mr. Kennedy has put it, giving “thanks through prayer” briefly and by himself “on the playing field” at the conclusion of each game he coaches. App. 168, 171. Mr. Kennedy has indicated repeatedly that he is willing to “wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the field” to “wal[k] to mid-field to say [his] short, private, personal prayer.” *Id.*, at 69; see also *id.*, at 280, 282. The contested exercise before us does not involve leading prayers with the team or before any other captive audience. Mr. Kennedy’s “religious beliefs do not require [him] to lead any prayer . . . involving students.” *Id.*, at 170. At the District’s request, he voluntarily discontinued the school tradition of locker-room prayers and his postgame religious talks to students. The District disciplined him *only* for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his players after three games in October 2015. See Parts I–B and I–C, *supra*.

Nor does anyone question that, in forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s brief prayer, the District failed to act pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable rule. A government policy will not qualify as neutral if it is “specifically directed at . . . religious practice.” *Smith*, 494 U. S., at 878. A policy can fail this test if it “discriminate[s] on its face,” or if a religious exercise is otherwise its “object.” *Lukumi*, 508 U. S., at 533; see also *Smith*, 494 U. S., at 878. A government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it “prohibits re-

---

*Civil Rights Comm’n*, 584 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2018) (slip op., at 18). To resolve today’s case, however, we have no need to consult that test. Likewise, while the test we do apply today has been the subject of some criticism, see, e.g., *Fulton v. Philadelphia*, 593 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2021) (slip op., at 5), we have no need to engage with that debate today because no party has asked us to do so.

## Opinion of the Court

ligious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way," or if it provides "a mechanism for individualized exemptions." *Fulton*, 593 U. S., at \_\_\_ (slip op., at 6). Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. See *Lukumi*, 508 U. S., at 546.

In this case, the District's challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy's actions at least in part because of their religious character. As it put it in its September 17 letter, the District prohibited "any overt actions on Mr. Kennedy's part, appearing to a reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-initiated prayer." App. 81. The District further explained that it could not allow "an employee, while still on duty, to engage in *religious* conduct." *Id.*, at 106 (emphasis added). Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District's unquestioned "object." The District candidly acknowledged as much below, conceding that its policies were "not neutral" toward religion. 991 F. 3d, at 1020.

The District's challenged policies also fail the general applicability test. The District's performance evaluation after the 2015 football season advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he "failed to supervise student-athletes after games." App. 114. But, in fact, this was a bespoke requirement specifically addressed to Mr. Kennedy's religious exercise. The District permitted other members of the coaching staff to forgo supervising students briefly after the game to do things like visit with friends or take personal phone calls. App. 205; see also Part I–B, *supra*. Thus, any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded, across-the-board way. Again recognizing as much, the District conceded before the Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not "generally applicable." 991 F. 3d, at 1020.

## Opinion of the Court

## B

When it comes to Mr. Kennedy’s free speech claim, our precedents remind us that the First Amendment’s protections extend to “teachers and students,” neither of whom “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.*, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); see also *Lane v. Franks*, 573 U. S. 228, 231 (2014). Of course, none of this means the speech rights of public school employees are so boundless that they may deliver any message to anyone anytime they wish. In addition to being private citizens, teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part to speak on the government’s behalf and convey its intended messages.

To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court’s decisions in *Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.*, 391 U. S. 563 (1968), *Garcetti*, 547 U. S. 410, and related cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. If a public employee speaks “pursuant to [his or her] official duties,” this Court has said the Free Speech Clause generally will not shield the individual from an employer’s control and discipline because that kind of speech is—for constitutional purposes at least—the government’s own speech. *Id.*, at 421.

At the same time and at the other end of the spectrum, when an employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” our cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. *Id.*, at 423. At this second step, our cases suggest that courts should attempt to engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.” *Ibid.* Among other things, courts at this

## Opinion of the Court

second step have sometimes considered whether an employee's speech interests are outweighed by "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." *Id.*, at 417 (quoting *Pickering*, 391 U. S., at 568).

Both sides ask us to employ at least certain aspects of this *Pickering–Garcetti* framework to resolve Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim. They share additional common ground too. They agree that Mr. Kennedy's speech implicates a matter of public concern. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 183; Brief for Respondent 44. They also appear to accept, at least for argument's sake, that Mr. Kennedy's speech does not raise questions of academic freedom that may or may not involve "additional" First Amendment "interests" beyond those captured by this framework. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 425; see also *Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.*, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Brief for Petitioner 26, n. 2. At the first step of the *Pickering–Garcetti* inquiry, the parties' disagreement thus turns out to center on one question alone: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District?

Our cases offer some helpful guidance for resolving this question. In *Garcetti*, the Court concluded that a prosecutor's internal memorandum to a supervisor was made "pursuant to [his] official duties," and thus ineligible for First Amendment protection. 547 U. S., at 421. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that the prosecutor's speech "fulfill[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case." *Ibid.* In other words, the prosecutor's memorandum was government speech because it was speech the government "itself ha[d] commissioned or created" and speech the employee was expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job. *Id.*, at 422.

## Opinion of the Court

By contrast, in *Lane* a public employer sought to terminate an employee after he testified at a criminal trial about matters involving his government employment. 573 U. S., at 233. The Court held that the employee’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. *Id.*, at 231. In doing so, the Court held that the fact the speech touched on matters related to public employment was not enough to render it government speech. *Id.*, at 239–240. Instead, the Court explained, the “critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.” *Id.*, at 240. It is an inquiry this Court has said should be undertaken “practical[ly],” rather than with a blinkered focus on the terms of some formal and capacious written job description. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 424. To proceed otherwise would be to allow public employers to use “excessively broad job descriptions” to subvert the Constitution’s protections. *Ibid.*

Applying these lessons here, it seems clear to us that Mr. Kennedy has demonstrated that his speech was private speech, not government speech. When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach. *Lane*, 573 U. S., at 240. He did not speak pursuant to government policy. He was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. See Part I–B, *supra*. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy’s prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy’s responsibilities as a public employee. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 421.

The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy’s prayers confirm the point. During the postgame period when these prayers occurred, coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters—everything from checking sports scores on their phones to greeting friends and family in the stands.

## Opinion of the Court

App. 205; see Part I–B, *supra*. We find it unlikely that Mr. Kennedy was fulfilling a responsibility imposed by his employment by praying during a period in which the District has acknowledged that its coaching staff was free to engage in all manner of private speech. That Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers when students were engaged in other activities like singing the school fight song further suggests that those prayers were not delivered as an address to the team, but instead in his capacity as a private citizen. Nor is it dispositive that Mr. Kennedy’s prayers took place “within the office” environment—here, on the field of play. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 421. Instead, what matters is whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. And taken together, both the substance of Mr. Kennedy’s speech and the circumstances surrounding it point to the conclusion that he did not.

In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stressed that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy served as a role model “clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom.” 991 F. 3d, at 1015. The court emphasized that Mr. Kennedy remained on duty after games. *Id.*, at 1016. Before us, the District presses the same arguments. See Brief for Respondent 24. And no doubt they have a point. Teachers and coaches often serve as vital role models. But this argument commits the error of positing an “excessively broad job descriptio[n]” by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 424. On this understanding, a school could fire a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf in the classroom or prohibit a Christian aide from praying quietly over her lunch in the cafeteria. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Court’s conclusion (and the District’s concession) that Mr. Kennedy’s actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, check a text, so-



## Opinion of the Court

cialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities. Others working for the District were free to engage briefly in personal speech and activity. App. 205; see Part I–B, *supra*. That Mr. Kennedy chose to use the same time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech. To hold differently would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court’s repeated promise that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” *Tinker*, 393 U. S., at 506.

Of course, acknowledging that Mr. Kennedy’s prayers represented his own private speech does not end the matter. So far, we have recognized only that Mr. Kennedy has carried his threshold burden. Under the *Pickering–Garcetti* framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove that its interests as employer outweigh even an employee’s private speech on a matter of public concern. See *Lane*, 573 U. S., at 236, 242.<sup>2</sup>

## IV

Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See *Lukumi*, 508 U. S., at 533; n. 1, *supra*. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See *Reed*, 576 U. S., at 171. The District, however, asks us to apply to Mr. Kennedy’s claims the

---

<sup>2</sup>Because our analysis and the parties’ concessions lead to the conclusion that Mr. Kennedy’s prayer constituted private speech on a matter of public concern, we do not decide whether the Free Exercise Clause may sometimes demand a different analysis at the first step of the *Pickering–Garcetti* framework.

## Opinion of the Court

more lenient second-step *Pickering–Garcetti* test, or alternatively intermediate scrutiny. See Brief for Respondent 44–48. Ultimately, however, it does not matter which standard we apply. The District cannot sustain its burden under any of them.<sup>3</sup>

## A

As we have seen, the District argues that its suspension of Mr. Kennedy was essential to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. *Id.*, at 35–42. On its account, Mr. Kennedy’s prayers might have been protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. But his rights were in “direct tension” with the competing demands of the Establishment Clause. App. 43. To resolve that clash, the District reasoned, Mr. Kennedy’s rights had to “yield.” *Ibid.* The Ninth Circuit pursued this same line of thinking, insisting that the District’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation “trump[ed]” Mr. Kennedy’s rights to religious exercise and free speech. 991 F. 3d, at 1017; see also *id.*, at 1020–1021.

But how could that be? It is true that this Court and others often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Exercise Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.” Amdt. 1. A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail

---

<sup>3</sup>It seems, too, that it is only here where our disagreement with the dissent begins in earnest. We do not understand our colleagues to contest that Mr. Kennedy has met his burdens under either the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, but only to suggest the District has carried its own burden “to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedy’s public prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.” *Post*, at 22 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).

## Opinion of the Court

over the others. See *Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing*, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1947).

The District arrived at a different understanding this way. It began with the premise that the Establishment Clause is offended whenever a “reasonable observer” could conclude that the government has “endorse[d]” religion. App. 81. The District then took the view that a “reasonable observer” could think it “endorsed Kennedy’s religious activity by not stopping the practice.” 991 F. 3d, at 1018; see also App. 80–81; Parts I and II, *supra*. On the District’s account, it did not matter whether the Free Exercise Clause protected Mr. Kennedy’s prayer. It did not matter if his expression was private speech protected by the Free Speech Clause. It did not matter that the District never actually endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s prayer, no one complained that it had, and a strong public reaction only followed after the District sought to ban Mr. Kennedy’s prayer. Because a reasonable observer could (mistakenly) infer that by allowing the prayer the District endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s message, the District felt it had to act, even if that meant suppressing otherwise protected First Amendment activities. In this way, the District effectively created its own “vise between the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other,” placed itself in the middle, and then chose its preferred way out of its self-imposed trap. See *Pinette*, 515 U. S., at 768 (plurality opinion); *Shurtleff v. Boston*, 596 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_–\_\_\_ (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4–5).

To defend its approach, the District relied on *Lemon* and its progeny. See App. 43–45. In upholding the District’s actions, the Ninth Circuit followed the same course. See Part II–C, *supra*. And, to be sure, in *Lemon* this Court attempted a “grand unified theory” for assessing Establishment Clause claims. *American Legion v. American Humanist Assn.*, 588 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip

## Opinion of the Court

op., at 24). That approach called for an examination of a law’s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with religion. *Lemon*, 403 U. S., at 612–613. In time, the approach also came to involve estimations about whether a “reasonable observer” would consider the government’s challenged action an “endorsement” of religion. See, e.g., *County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter*, 492 U. S. 573, 593 (1989); *id.*, at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); *Shurtleff*, 596 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3).

What the District and the Ninth Circuit overlooked, however, is that the “shortcomings” associated with this “ambitiou[s],” abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause became so “apparent” that this Court long ago abandoned *Lemon* and its endorsement test offshoot. *American Legion*, 588 U. S., at \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 12–13); see also *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 572 U. S. 565, 575–577 (2014). The Court has explained that these tests “invited chaos” in lower courts, led to “differing results” in materially identical cases, and created a “mine-field” for legislators. *Pinette*, 515 U. S., at 768–769, n. 3 (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). This Court has since made plain, too, that the Establishment Clause does not include anything like a “modified heckler’s veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed” based on “‘perceptions’” or “‘discomfort.’” *Good News Club v. Milford Central School*, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001) (emphasis deleted). An Establishment Clause violation does not automatically follow whenever a public school or other government entity “fail[s] to censor” private religious speech. *Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens*, 496 U. S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion). Nor does the Clause “compel the government to purge from the public sphere” anything an objective observer could reasonably infer endorses or “partakes of the religious.” *Van Orden v.*

## Opinion of the Court

*Perry*, 545 U. S. 677, 699 (2005) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). In fact, just this Term the Court unanimously rejected a city’s attempt to censor religious speech based on *Lemon* and the endorsement test. See *Shurtleff*, 596 U. S., at \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 1–2); *id.*, at \_\_\_\_ (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); *id.*, at \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 1, 4–5).<sup>4</sup>

In place of *Lemon* and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” *Town of Greece*, 572 U. S., at 576; see also *American Legion*, 588 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 25). “[T]he line” that courts and governments “must draw between the permissible and the impermissible” has to “‘accor[d] with history and faithfully reflec[t] the understanding of the Founding Fathers.’” *Town of Greece*,

---

<sup>4</sup>Nor was that decision an outlier. In the last two decades, this Court has often criticized or ignored *Lemon* and its endorsement test variation. See, e.g., *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*, 591 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2020); *American Legion v. American Humanist Assn.*, 588 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2019); *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2018); *Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer*, 582 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2017); *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 572 U. S. 565 (2014); *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC*, 565 U. S. 171 (2012); *Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn*, 563 U. S. 125 (2011); *Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.*, 551 U. S. 587 (2007); *id.*, at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); *Van Orden v. Perry*, 545 U. S. 677 (2005); *id.*, at 689 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). A vast number of Justices have criticized those tests over an even longer period. See *Shurtleff v. Boston*, 596 U. S. \_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_, and nn. 9–10 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7–8, and nn. 9–10) (collecting opinions authored or joined by ROBERTS and Rehnquist, C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.). The point has not been lost on our lower court colleagues. See, e.g., 4 F. 4th 910, 939–941 (2021) (O’Scannlain, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc); *id.*, at 945 (R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); *id.*, at 947, n. 3 (collecting lower court cases from “around the country” that “have recognized *Lemon*’s demise”).

## Opinion of the Court

572 U. S., at 577 (quoting *School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some “exception” within the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” 572 U. S., at 575; see *American Legion*, 588 U. S., at \_\_\_ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 25); *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U. S. 488, 490 (1961) (analyzing certain historical elements of religious establishments); *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U. S. 420, 437–440 (1961) (analyzing Sunday closing laws by looking to their “place . . . in the First Amendment’s history”); *Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York*, 397 U. S. 664, 680 (1970) (analyzing the “history and uninterrupted practice” of church tax exemptions). The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance.

## B

Perhaps sensing that the primary theory it pursued below rests on a mistaken understanding of the Establishment Clause, the District offers a backup argument in this Court. It still contends that its Establishment Clause concerns trump Mr. Kennedy’s free exercise and free speech rights. But the District now seeks to supply different reasoning for that result. Now, it says, it was justified in suppressing Mr. Kennedy’s religious activity because otherwise it would have been guilty of coercing students to pray. See Brief for Respondent 34–37. And, the District says, coercing worship amounts to an Establishment Clause violation on anyone’s account of the Clause’s original meaning.

As it turns out, however, there is a pretty obvious reason why the Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceedings below: The evidence cannot sustain it. To be sure, this Court has long held that government may not, consistent with a historically sensitive understanding of the Estab-

## Opinion of the Court

lishment Clause, “make a religious observance compulsory.” *Zorach v. Clauser*, 343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952). Government “may not coerce anyone to attend church,” *ibid.*, nor may it force citizens to engage in “a formal religious exercise,” *Lee v. Weisman*, 505 U. S. 577, 589 (1992). No doubt, too, coercion along these lines was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.<sup>5</sup> Members of this Court have sometimes disagreed on what exactly qualifies as impermissible coercion in light of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause. Compare *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 593, with *id.*, at 640–641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But in this case Mr. Kennedy’s private religious exercise did not come close to crossing any line one might imagine separating protected private expression from impermissible government coercion.

Begin with the District’s own contemporaneous description of the facts. In its correspondence with Mr. Kennedy, the District never raised coercion concerns. To the contrary, the District conceded in a public 2015 document that there was “no evidence that students [were] directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.” App. 105. This is consistent with Mr. Kennedy’s account too. He has repeatedly stated that he “never coerced, required, or asked any student to pray,” and that he never “told any student that it was important that they participate in any religious activity.” *Id.*, at 170.

Consider, too, the actual requests Mr. Kennedy made. The District did not discipline Mr. Kennedy for engaging in

---

<sup>5</sup>See, e.g., *Lee v. Weisman*, 505 U. S. 577, 640–642 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting); *Shurtleff*, 596 U. S., at \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 10–13) (discussing coercion and certain other historical hallmarks of an established religion); 1 *Annals of Cong.* 730–731 (1789) (Madison explaining that the First Amendment aimed to prevent one or multiple sects from “establish[ing] a religion to which they would compel others to conform”); M. McConnell, *Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion*, 44 *Wm. & Mary L. Rev.* 2105, 2144–2146 (2003).

## Opinion of the Court

prayer while presenting locker-room speeches to students. That tradition predated Mr. Kennedy at the school. App. 170. And he willingly ended it, as the District has acknowledged. *Id.*, at 77, 170. He also willingly ended his practice of postgame religious talks with his team. *Id.*, at 70, 77, 170–172. The only prayer Mr. Kennedy sought to continue was the kind he had “started out doing” at the beginning of his tenure—the prayer he gave alone. *Id.*, at 293–294. He made clear that he could pray “while the kids were doing the fight song” and “take a knee by [him]self and give thanks and continue on.” *Id.*, at 294. Mr. Kennedy even considered it “acceptable” to say his “prayer while the players were walking to the locker room” or “bus,” and then catch up with his team. *Id.*, at 280, 282; see also *id.*, at 59 (proposing the team leave the field for the prayer). In short, Mr. Kennedy did not seek to direct any prayers to students or require anyone else to participate. His plan was to wait to pray until athletes were occupied, and he “told everybody” that’s what he wished “to do.” *Id.*, at 292. It was for three prayers of this sort alone in October 2015 that the District suspended him. See Parts I–B and I–C, *supra*.

Naturally, Mr. Kennedy’s proposal to pray quietly by himself on the field would have meant some people would have seen his religious exercise. Those close at hand might have heard him too. But learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,” a trait of character essential to “a tolerant citizenry.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 590. This Court has long recognized as well that “secondary school students are mature enough . . . to understand that a school does not endorse,” let alone coerce them to participate in, “speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” *Mergens*, 496 U. S., at 250 (plurality opinion). Of course, some will take offense to certain forms of speech or prayer they are sure to encounter in a society where those activities enjoy such robust constitutional protection. But “[o]ffense . . .



## Opinion of the Court

does not equate to coercion.” *Town of Greece*, 572 U. S., at 589 (plurality opinion).

The District responds that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy “wielded enormous authority and influence over the students,” and students might have felt compelled to pray alongside him. Brief for Respondent 37. To support this argument, the District submits that, after Mr. Kennedy’s suspension, a few parents told District employees that their sons had “participated in the team prayers only because they did not wish to separate themselves from the team.” App. 356.

This reply fails too. Not only does the District rely on hearsay to advance it. For all we can tell, the concerns the District says it heard from parents were occasioned by the locker-room prayers that predated Mr. Kennedy’s tenure or his postgame religious talks, all of which he discontinued at the District’s request. There is no indication in the record that anyone expressed any coercion concerns to the District about the quiet, postgame prayers that Mr. Kennedy asked to continue and that led to his suspension. Nor is there any record evidence that students felt pressured to participate in these prayers. To the contrary, and as we have seen, not a single Bremerton student joined Mr. Kennedy’s quiet prayers following the three October 2015 games for which he was disciplined. On October 16, those students who joined Mr. Kennedy were “from the opposing team,” 991 F. 3d, at 1012–1013, and thus could not have “reasonably fear[ed]” that he would decrease their “playing time” or destroy their “opportunities” if they did not “participate,” Brief for Respondent 43. As for the other two relevant games, “no one joined” Mr. Kennedy on October 23. 991 F. 3d, at 1019. And only a few members of the public participated on October 26. App. 97, 314–315; see also Part I—

## Opinion of the Court

B, *supra*.<sup>6</sup>

The absence of evidence of coercion in this record leaves the District to its final redoubt. Here, the District suggests that *any* visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students. In essence, the District asks us to adopt the view that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression. See also *post*, at 16–17 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). If the argument sounds familiar, it should. Really, it is just another way of repackaging the District’s earlier submission that government may script everything a teacher or coach says in the workplace. See Part III–B, *supra*. The only added twist here is the District’s suggestion not only that it *may* prohibit teachers from engaging in any demonstrative religious activity, but that it *must* do so in order to conform to the Constitution.

Such a rule would be a sure sign that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence had gone off the rails. In the name of protecting religious liberty, the District would have us suppress it. Rather than respect the First Amendment’s double protection for religious expression, it would have us preference secular activity. Not only could schools fire teachers for praying quietly over their lunch, for wearing a yarmulke to school, or for offering a midday prayer during a break before practice. Under the District’s rule, a school would be *required* to do so. It is a rule that would defy this Court’s traditional understanding that permitting private speech is

---

<sup>6</sup>The dissent expresses concern that looking to “histor[y] an[d] tradition” to guide Establishment Clause inquiries will not afford “school administrators” sufficient guidance. *Post*, at 30. But that concern supplies no excuse to adorn the Constitution with rules not supported by its terms and the traditions undergirding them. Nor, in any event, is there any question that the District understands that coercion can be a hallmark of an Establishment Clause violation. See App. 105. The District’s problem isn’t a failure to identify coercion as a crucial legal consideration; it is a lack of evidence that coercion actually occurred.

## Opinion of the Court

not the same thing as coercing others to participate in it. See *Town of Greece*, 572 U. S., at 589 (plurality opinion). It is a rule, too, that would undermine a long constitutional tradition under which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always been “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 590. We are aware of no historically sound understanding of the Establishment Clause that begins to “mak[e] it necessary for government to be hostile to religion” in this way. *Zorach*, 343 U. S., at 314.

Our judgments on all these scores find support in this Court’s prior cases too. In *Zorach*, for example, challengers argued that a public school program permitting students to spend time in private religious instruction off campus was impermissibly coercive. *Id.*, at 308, 311–312. The Court rejected that challenge because students were not required to attend religious instruction and there was no evidence that any employee had “us[ed] their office to persuade or force students” to participate in religious activity. *Id.*, at 311, and n. 6. What was clear there is even more obvious here—where there is no evidence anyone sought to persuade or force students to participate, and there is no formal school program accommodating the religious activity at issue.

Meanwhile, this case looks very different from those in which this Court has found prayer involving public school students to be problematically coercive. In *Lee*, this Court held that school officials violated the Establishment Clause by “including [a] clerical membe[r]” who publicly recited prayers “as part of [an] official school graduation ceremony” because the school had “in every practical sense compelled attendance and participation in” a “religious exercise.” 505 U. S., at 580, 598. In *Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe*, the Court held that a school district violated the Establishment Clause by broadcasting a prayer “over the public address system” before each football game. 530 U. S.

## Opinion of the Court

290, 294 (2000). The Court observed that, while students generally were not required to attend games, attendance *was* required for “cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, the team members themselves.” *Id.*, at 311. None of that is true here. The prayers for which Mr. Kennedy was disciplined were not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience. Students were not required or expected to participate. And, in fact, none of Mr. Kennedy’s students did participate in any of the three October 2015 prayers that resulted in Mr. Kennedy’s discipline. See App. 90, 97, 173, 236–239; Parts I–B and I–C, *supra*.<sup>7</sup>

## C

In the end, the District’s case hinges on the need to generate conflict between an individual’s rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses and its own Establishment Clause duties—and then develop some explanation why one of these Clauses in the First Amendment should “trum[p]” the other two. 991 F. 3d, at 1017; App. 43. But the project falters badly. Not only does the District fail to offer a sound reason to prefer one constitutional guarantee

---

<sup>7</sup> Even if the personal prayers Mr. Kennedy sought to offer after games are not themselves coercive, the dissent suggests that they bear an indelible taint of coercion by association with the school’s past prayer practices—some of which predated Mr. Kennedy, and all of which the District concedes he ended on request. But none of those abandoned practices formed the basis for Mr. Kennedy’s suspension, and he has not sought to claim First Amendment protection for them. See *Town of Greece*, 572 U. S., at 585 (other past practices do not permanently “despoil a practice” later challenged under the Establishment Clause). Nor, contrary to the dissent, does the possibility that students might choose, unprompted, to participate in Mr. Kennedy’s prayers necessarily prove them coercive. See *post*, at 18–20, 32–33. For one thing, the District has conceded that no coach may “discourag[e]” voluntary student prayer under its policies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 91. For another, Mr. Kennedy has repeatedly explained that he is willing to conduct his prayer without students—as he did after each of the games that formed the basis of his suspension—and after students head to the locker room or bus. See App. 280, 282, 292–294.

## Opinion of the Court

over another. It cannot even show that they are at odds. In truth, there is no conflict between the constitutional commands before us. There is only the “mere shadow” of a conflict, a false choice premised on a misconception of the Establishment Clause. *Schempp*, 374 U. S., at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). And in no world may a government entity’s concerns about phantom constitutional violations justify actual violations of an individual’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., *Rosenberger*, 515 U. S., at 845–846; *Good News Club*, 533 U. S., at 112–119; *Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.*, 508 U. S. 384, 394–395 (1993); *Widmar*, 454 U. S., at 270–275.<sup>8</sup>

## V

Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic—whether those expressions take place in a sanctuary or on a field, and whether they manifest through the spoken word or a bowed head. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a brief, quiet, personal religious observance doubly protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. And the only meaningful justification the government offered for its reprisal rested on a mistaken view that it had a duty to ferret out and suppress

---

<sup>8</sup>Failing under its coercion theory, the District offers still another backup argument. It contends that it had to suppress Mr. Kennedy’s protected First Amendment activity to ensure order at Bremerton football games. See also *post*, at 2, 8–9, 11, 34–35 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). But the District never raised concerns along these lines in its contemporaneous correspondence with Mr. Kennedy. And unsurprisingly, neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit invoked this rationale to justify the District’s actions. Government “justification[s]” for interfering with First Amendment rights “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented *post hoc* in response to litigation.” *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996). Nor under our Constitution does protected speech or religious exercise readily give way to a “heckler’s veto.” *Good News Club v. Milford Central School*, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001); *supra*, at 22–23.

## Opinion of the Court

religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his First Amendment claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

*Reversed.*

THOMAS, J., concurring

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

No. 21–418

JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER *v.*  
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly holds that Bremerton School District violated Joseph Kennedy’s First Amendment rights. I write separately to emphasize that the Court’s opinion does not resolve two issues related to Kennedy’s free-exercise claim.

First, the Court refrains from deciding whether or how public employees’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause may or may not be different from those enjoyed by the general public. See *ante*, at 19, n. 2. In “striking the appropriate balance” between public employees’ constitutional rights and “the realities of the employment context,” we have often “consider[ed] whether the asserted employee right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitutional provision, or whether the claimed right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer.” *Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture*, 553 U. S. 591, 600 (2008). In the free-speech context, for example, that inquiry has prompted us to distinguish between different kinds of speech; we have held that “the First Amendment protects public employee speech only when it falls within the core of First Amendment protection—speech on matters of public concern.” *Ibid.* It remains an open question, however, if a similar analysis can or should apply to free-exercise claims in light of the “history” and

THOMAS, J., concurring

“tradition” of the Free Exercise Clause. *Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri*, 564 U. S. 379, 406 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also *id.*, at 400 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).

Second, the Court also does not decide what burden a government employer must shoulder to justify restricting an employee’s religious expression because the District had no constitutional basis for reprimanding Kennedy under any possibly applicable standard of scrutiny. See *ante*, at 20. While we have many public-employee precedents addressing how the interest-balancing test set out in *Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.*, 391 U. S. 563 (1968), applies under the Free Speech Clause, the Court has never before applied *Pickering* balancing to a claim brought under the Free Exercise Clause. A government employer’s burden therefore might differ depending on which First Amendment guarantee a public employee invokes.



ALITO, J., concurring

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

---

No. 21–418

---

JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER *v.*  
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.

The expression at issue in this case is unlike that in any of our prior cases involving the free-speech rights of public employees. Petitioner’s expression occurred while at work but during a time when a brief lull in his duties apparently gave him a few free moments to engage in private activities. When he engaged in this expression, he acted in a purely private capacity. The Court does not decide what standard applies to such expression under the Free Speech Clause but holds only that retaliation for this expression cannot be justified based on any of the standards discussed. On that understanding, I join the opinion in full.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 21–418

JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER *v.*  
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

This case is about whether a public school must permit a school official to kneel, bow his head, and say a prayer at the center of a school event. The Constitution does not authorize, let alone require, public schools to embrace this conduct. Since *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), this Court consistently has recognized that school officials leading prayer is constitutionally impermissible. Official-led prayer strikes at the core of our constitutional protections for the religious liberty of students and their parents, as embodied in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The Court now charts a different path, yet again paying almost exclusive attention to the Free Exercise Clause’s protection for individual religious exercise while giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on state establishment of religion. See *Carson v. Makin*, 596 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2022) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). To the degree the Court portrays petitioner Joseph Kennedy’s prayers as private and quiet, it misconstrues the facts. The record reveals that Kennedy had a longstanding practice of conducting demonstrative prayers on the 50-yard line of the football field. Kennedy consistently invited others to join his prayers and for years led student athletes

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

in prayer at the same time and location. The Court ignores this history. The Court also ignores the severe disruption to school events caused by Kennedy’s conduct, viewing it as irrelevant because the Bremerton School District (District) stated that it was suspending Kennedy to avoid it being viewed as endorsing religion. Under the Court’s analysis, presumably this would be a different case if the District had cited Kennedy’s repeated disruptions of school programming and violations of school policy regarding public access to the field as grounds for suspending him. As the District did not articulate those grounds, the Court assesses only the District’s Establishment Clause concerns. It errs by assessing them divorced from the context and history of Kennedy’s prayer practice.

Today’s decision goes beyond merely misreading the record. The Court overrules *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and calls into question decades of subsequent precedents that it deems “offshoot[s]” of that decision. *Ante*, at 22. In the process, the Court rejects longstanding concerns surrounding government endorsement of religion and replaces the standard for reviewing such questions with a new “history and tradition” test. In addition, while the Court reaffirms that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from coercing participation in religious exercise, it applies a nearly toothless version of the coercion analysis, failing to acknowledge the unique pressures faced by students when participating in school-sponsored activities. This decision does a disservice to schools and the young citizens they serve, as well as to our Nation’s longstanding commitment to the separation of church and state. I respectfully dissent.

## I

As the majority tells it, Kennedy, a coach for the District’s football program, “lost his job” for “pray[ing] quietly while

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

his students were otherwise occupied.” *Ante*, at 1. The record before us, however, tells a different story.

## A

The District serves approximately 5,057 students and employs 332 teachers and 400 nonteaching personnel in Kitsap County, Washington. The county is home to Bahá’ís, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, and many denominations of Christians, as well as numerous residents who are religiously unaffiliated. See Brief for Religious and Denominational Organizations et al. as *Amici Curiae* 4.

The District first hired Kennedy in 2008, on a renewable annual contract, to serve as a part-time assistant coach for the varsity football team and head coach for the junior varsity team at Bremerton High School (BHS). Kennedy’s job description required him to “[a]ccompany and direct” all home and out-of-town games to which he was assigned, overseeing preparation and transportation before games, being “[r]esponsible for player behavior both on and off the field,” supervising dressing rooms, and “secur[ing] all facilities at the close of each practice.” App. 32–34, 36. His duties encompassed “supervising student activities immediately following the completion of the game” until the students were released to their parents or otherwise allowed to leave. *Id.*, at 133.

The District also set requirements for Kennedy’s interactions with players, obliging him, like all coaches, to “exhibit sportsmanlike conduct at all times,” “utilize positive motivational strategies to encourage athletic performance,” and serve as a “mentor and role model for the student athletes.” *Id.*, at 56. In addition, Kennedy’s position made him responsible for interacting with members of the community. In this capacity, the District required Kennedy and other coaches to “maintain positive media relations,” “always approach officials with composure” with the expectation that

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

they were “constantly being observed by others,” and “communicate effectively” with parents. *Ibid.*


Finally, District coaches had to “[a]dhere to [District] policies and administrative regulations” more generally. *Id.*, at 30–31. As relevant here, the District’s policy on “Religious-Related Activities and Practices” provided that “[s]chool staff shall neither encourage or discourage a student from engaging in non-disruptive oral or silent prayer or any other form of devotional activity” and that “[r]eligious services, programs or assemblies shall not be conducted in school facilities during school hours or in connection with any school sponsored or school related activity.” *Id.*, at 26–28.

## B

In September 2015, a coach from another school’s football team informed BHS’ principal that Kennedy had asked him and his team to join Kennedy in prayer. The other team’s coach told the principal that he thought it was “‘cool’” that the District “‘would allow [its] coaches to go ahead and invite other teams’ coaches and players to pray after a game.’” *Id.*, at 229.

The District initiated an inquiry into whether its policy on Religious-Related Activities and Practices had been violated. It learned that, since his hiring in 2008, Kennedy had been kneeling on the 50-yard line to pray immediately after shaking hands with the opposing team. Kennedy recounted that he initially prayed alone and that he never asked any student to join him. Over time, however, a majority of the team came to join him, with the numbers varying from game to game. Kennedy’s practice evolved into postgame talks in which Kennedy would hold aloft student helmets and deliver speeches with “overtly religious references,” which Kennedy described as prayers, while the players kneeled around him. *Id.*, at 40. The District also learned that students had prayed in the past in the locker

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting



Photograph of J. Kennedy standing in group of kneeling players.

room prior to games, before Kennedy was hired, but that Kennedy subsequently began leading those prayers too.

While the District's inquiry was pending, its athletic director attended BHS' September 11, 2015, football game and told Kennedy that he should not be conducting prayers with players. After the game, while the athletic director watched, Kennedy led a prayer out loud, holding up a player's helmet as the players kneeled around him. While riding the bus home with the team, Kennedy posted on Facebook that he thought he might have just been fired for praying.

On September 17, the District's superintendent sent Kennedy a letter informing him that leading prayers with students on the field and in the locker room would likely be found to violate the Establishment Clause, exposing the District to legal liability. The District acknowledged that

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Kennedy had “not actively encouraged, or required, participation” but emphasized that “school staff may not indirectly encourage students to engage in religious activity” or “endors[e]” religious activity; rather, the District explained, staff “must remain neutral” “while performing their job duties.” *Id.*, at 41–43. The District instructed Kennedy that any motivational talks to students must remain secular, “so as to avoid alienation of any team member.” *Id.*, at 44.

The District reiterated that “all District staff are free to engage in religious activity, including prayer, so long as it does not interfere with job responsibilities.” *Id.*, at 45. To avoid endorsing student religious exercise, the District instructed that such activity must be nondemonstrative or conducted separately from students, away from student activities. *Ibid.* The District expressed concern that Kennedy had continued his midfield prayer practice at two games after the District’s athletic director and the varsity team’s head coach had instructed him to stop. *Id.*, at 40–41.

Kennedy stopped participating in locker room prayers and, after a game the following day, gave a secular speech. He returned to pray in the stadium alone after his duties were over and everyone had left the stadium, to which the District had no objection. Kennedy then hired an attorney, who, on October 14, sent a letter explaining that Kennedy was “motivated by his sincerely-held religious beliefs to pray following each football game.” *Id.*, at 63. The letter claimed that the District had required that Kennedy “flee from students if they voluntarily choose to come to a place where he is privately praying during personal time,” referring to the 50-yard line of the football field immediately following the conclusion of a game. *Id.*, at 70. Kennedy requested that the District simply issue a “clarif[ication] that the prayer is [Kennedy’s] private speech” and that the District not “interfere” with students joining Kennedy in prayer. *Id.*, at 71. The letter further announced that Kennedy would resume his 50-yard-line prayer practice the

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

next day after the October 16 homecoming game.<sup>1</sup>

Before the homecoming game, Kennedy made multiple media appearances to publicize his plans to pray at the 50-yard line, leading to an article in the *Seattle News* and a local television broadcast about the upcoming homecoming game. In the wake of this media coverage, the District began receiving a large number of emails, letters, and calls, many of them threatening.

The District responded to Kennedy's letter before the game on October 16. It emphasized that Kennedy's letter evinced "materia[l] misunderstand[ings]" of many of the facts at issue. *Id.*, at 76. For instance, Kennedy's letter asserted that he had not invited anyone to pray with him; the District noted that that might be true of Kennedy's September 17 prayer specifically, but that Kennedy had acknowledged inviting others to join him on many previous occasions. The District's September 17 letter had explained that Kennedy traditionally held up helmets from the BHS and opposing teams while players from each team kneeled around him. While Kennedy's letter asserted that his prayers "occurr[ed] 'on his own time,' after his duties as a District employee had ceased," the District pointed out that Kennedy "remain[ed] on duty" when his prayers occurred "immediately following completion of the football game, when students are still on the football field, in uniform, under the stadium lights, with the audience still in attendance, and while Mr. Kennedy is still in his District-issued and District-logoed attire." *Id.*, at 78 (emphasis deleted).

---

<sup>1</sup> The Court recounts that Kennedy was "willing to say his 'prayer while the players were walking to the locker room' or 'bus,' and then catch up with his team." *Ante*, at 4 (quoting App. 280–282); see also *ante*, at 5. Kennedy made the quoted remarks, however, only during his deposition in the underlying litigation, stating in response to a question that such timing would have been "physically possible" and "possibly" have been acceptable to him, but that he had never "discuss[ed] with the District whether that was a possibility for [him] to do" and had "no idea" whether his lawyers raised it with the District. App. 280.



SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

The District further noted that “[d]uring the time following completion of the game, until players are released to their parents or otherwise allowed to leave the event, Mr. Kennedy, like all coaches, is clearly on duty and paid to continue supervision of students.” *Id.*, at 79.

The District stated that it had no objection to Kennedy returning to the stadium when he was off duty to pray at the 50-yard line, nor with Kennedy praying while on duty if it did not interfere with his job duties or suggest the District’s endorsement of religion. The District explained that its establishment concerns were motivated by the specific facts at issue, because engaging in prayer on the 50-yard line immediately after the game finished would appear to be an extension of Kennedy’s “prior, long-standing and well-known history of leading students in prayer” on the 50-yard line after games. *Id.*, at 81. The District therefore reaffirmed its prior directives to Kennedy.

On October 16, after playing of the game had concluded, Kennedy shook hands with the opposing team, and as advertised, knelt to pray while most BHS players were singing the school’s fight song. He quickly was joined by coaches and players from the opposing team. Television news cameras surrounded the group.<sup>2</sup> Members of the public rushed the field to join Kennedy, jumping fences to access the field and knocking over student band members. After the game, the District received calls from Satanists who “‘intended to conduct ceremonies on the field after football games if others were allowed to.’” *Id.*, at 181. To secure the field and enable subsequent games to continue safely, the District was forced to make security arrangements with

---

<sup>2</sup>The Court describes the events of the October 16 game as having “spurred media coverage of Mr. Kennedy’s case.” *Ante*, at 5. In fact, the District Court found that Kennedy himself generated the media coverage by publicizing his dispute with the District in his initial Facebook posting and in his media appearances before the October 16 game. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1230 (WD Wash. 2020).

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the local police and to post signs near the field and place robocalls to parents reiterating that the field was not open to the public.



Photograph of J. Kennedy in prayer circle (Oct. 16, 2015).

The District sent Kennedy another letter on October 23, explaining that his conduct at the October 16 game was inconsistent with the District’s requirements for two reasons. First, it “drew [him] away from [his] work”; Kennedy had, “until recently, . . . regularly c[o]me to the locker room with the team and other coaches following the game” and had “specific responsibility for the supervision of players in the locker room following games.” *Id.*, at 92–93. Second, his conduct raised Establishment Clause concerns, because “any reasonable observer saw a District employee, on the field only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty, under the bright lights of the stadium, engaged in what was clearly, given [his] prior public conduct, overtly religious conduct.” *Id.*, at 93.

Again, the District emphasized that it was happy to accommodate Kennedy’s desire to pray on the job in a way

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that did not interfere with his duties or risk perceptions of endorsement. Stressing that “[d]evelopment of accommodations is an interactive process,” it invited Kennedy to reach out to discuss accommodations that might be mutually satisfactory, offering proposed accommodations and inviting Kennedy to raise others. *Id.*, at 93–94. The District noted, however, that “further violations of [its] directives” would be grounds for discipline or termination. *Id.*, at 95.

Kennedy did not directly respond or suggest a satisfactory accommodation. Instead, his attorneys told the media that he would accept only demonstrative prayer on the 50-yard line immediately after games. During the October 23 and October 26 games, Kennedy again prayed at the 50-yard line immediately following the game, while postgame activities were still ongoing. At the October 23 game, Kennedy knelt on the field alone with players standing nearby. At the October 26 game, Kennedy prayed surrounded by members of the public, including state representatives who attended the game to support Kennedy. The BHS players, after singing the fight song, joined Kennedy at midfield after he stood up from praying.



Photograph of J. Kennedy in prayer circle (Oct. 26, 2015).

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

In an October 28 letter, the District notified Kennedy that it was placing him on paid administrative leave for violating its directives at the October 16, October 23, and October 26 games by kneeling on the field and praying immediately following the games before rejoining the players for postgame talks. The District recounted that it had offered accommodations to, and offered to engage in further discussions with, Kennedy to permit his religious exercise, and that Kennedy had failed to respond to these offers. The District stressed that it remained willing to discuss possible accommodations if Kennedy was willing.

After the issues with Kennedy arose, several parents reached out to the District saying that their children had participated in Kennedy's prayers solely to avoid separating themselves from the rest of the team. No BHS students appeared to pray on the field after Kennedy's suspension.

In Kennedy's annual review, the head coach of the varsity team recommended Kennedy not be rehired because he "failed to follow district policy," "demonstrated a lack of cooperation with administration," "contributed to negative relations between parents, students, community members, coaches, and the school district," and "failed to supervise student-athletes after games due to his interactions with media and community" members. *Id.*, at 114. The head coach himself also resigned after 11 years in that position, expressing fears that he or his staff would be shot from the crowd or otherwise attacked because of the turmoil created by Kennedy's media appearances. Three of five other assistant coaches did not reapply.

## C

Kennedy then filed suit. He contended, as relevant, that the District violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Kennedy moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Court denied based on the circumstances surrounding Kennedy's prayers. The court concluded that Kennedy had "chose[n] a time and event," the October 16 homecoming game, that was "a big deal" for students, and then "used that opportunity to convey his religious views" in a manner a reasonable observer would have seen as a "public employee . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith." App. to Pet. for Cert. 303. The Court of Appeals affirmed, again emphasizing the specific context of Kennedy's prayers. The court rejected Kennedy's contention that he had been "praying on the fifty-yard line 'silently and alone.'" *Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.*, 869 F. 3d 813, 825 (CA9 2017). The court noted that he had in fact refused "an accommodation permitting him to pray . . . after the stadium had emptied," "indicat[ing] that it is essential that his speech be delivered in the presence of students and spectators." *Ibid.* This Court denied certiorari.

Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the District. The court concluded that Kennedy's 50-yard-line prayers were not entitled to protection under the Free Speech Clause because his speech was made in his capacity as a public employee, not as a private citizen. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (WD Wash. 2020). In addition, the court held that Kennedy's prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause, reasoning that "speech from the center of the football field immediately after each game . . . conveys official sanction." *Id.*, at 1238. That was especially true where Kennedy, a school employee, initiated the prayer; Kennedy was "joined by students or adults to create a group of worshippers in a place the school controls access to"; and Kennedy had a long "history of engaging in religious activity with players" that would have led a familiar observer to believe that Kennedy was "continuing this tradition" with prayer at the 50-yard line. *Id.*, at 1238–1239. The District Court further found that players had reported

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

“feeling compelled to join Kennedy in prayer to stay connected with the team or ensure playing time,” and that the “slow accumulation of players joining Kennedy suggests exactly the type of vulnerability to social pressure that makes the Establishment Clause vital in the high school context.” *Id.*, at 1239. The court rejected Kennedy’s free exercise claim, finding the District’s directive narrowly tailored to its Establishment Clause concerns and citing Kennedy’s refusal to cooperate in finding an accommodation that would be acceptable to him. *Id.*, at 1240.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that “the facts in the record utterly belie [Kennedy’s] contention that the prayer was personal and private.” 991 F.3d 1004, 1017 (CA9 2021). The court instead concluded that Kennedy’s speech constituted government speech, as he “repeatedly acknowledged that—and behaved as if—he was a mentor, motivational speaker, and role model to students specifically at the conclusion of the game.” *Id.*, at 1015 (emphasis deleted). In the alternative, the court concluded that Kennedy’s speech, even if in his capacity as a private citizen, was appropriately regulated by the District to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, emphasizing once more that this conclusion was tied to the specific “evolution of Kennedy’s prayer practice with students” over time. *Id.*, at 1018. The court rejected Kennedy’s free exercise claim for the reasons stated by the District Court. *Id.*, at 1020. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc, and this Court granted certiorari.

## II

Properly understood, this case is not about the limits on an individual’s ability to engage in private prayer at work. This case is about whether a school district is required to allow one of its employees to incorporate a public, communicative display of the employee’s personal religious beliefs into a school event, where that display is recognizable as

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

part of a longstanding practice of the employee ministering religion to students as the public watched. A school district is not required to permit such conduct; in fact, the Establishment Clause prohibits it from doing so.

A

The Establishment Clause prohibits States from adopting laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” Amdt. 1; see *Wallace v. Jaffree*, 472 U. S. 38, 49 (1985) (recognizing the Clause’s incorporation against the States). The First Amendment’s next Clause prohibits the government from making any law “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Taken together, these two Clauses (the Religion Clauses) express the view, foundational to our constitutional system, “that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State.” *Lee v. Weisman*, 505 U. S. 577, 589 (1992). Instead, “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere,” which has the “freedom to pursue that mission.” *Ibid.*

The Establishment Clause protects this freedom by “command[ing] a separation of church and state.” *Cutter v. Wilkinson*, 544 U. S. 709, 719 (2005). At its core, this means forbidding “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” *Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York*, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970). In the context of public schools, it means that a State cannot use “its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals.” *Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty.*, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).

Indeed, “[t]he Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.” *Edwards v. Aguillard*, 482 U. S. 578, 583–584 (1987). The reasons motivating this

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

vigilance inhere in the nature of schools themselves and the young people they serve. Two are relevant here.

First, government neutrality toward religion is particularly important in the public school context given the role public schools play in our society. “The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny,” meaning that “[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.” *Id.* at 584. Families “entrust public schools with the education of their children . . . on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.” *Ibid.* Accordingly, the Establishment Clause “proscribes public schools from ‘conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred’” or otherwise endorsing religious beliefs. *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 604–605 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted).

Second, schools face a higher risk of unconstitutionally “coerc[ing] . . . support or participat[ion] in religion or its exercise” than other government entities. *Id.*, at 587 (opinion of the Court). The State “exerts great authority and coercive power” in schools as a general matter “through mandatory attendance requirements.” *Edwards*, 482 U. S., at 584. Moreover, the State exercises that great authority over children, who are uniquely susceptible to “subtle coercive pressure.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 588; cf. *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 572 U. S. 565, 590 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“[M]ature adults,” unlike children, may not be “readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure”). Children are particularly vulnerable to coercion because of their “emulation of teachers as role models” and “susceptibility to peer pressure.” *Edwards*, 482 U. S., at 584. Accordingly, this Court has emphasized that “the State may



SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children” in the dilemma of choosing between “participating, with all that implies, or protesting” a religious exercise in a public school. *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 593.

Given the twin Establishment Clause concerns of endorsement and coercion, it is unsurprising that the Court has consistently held integrating prayer into public school activities to be unconstitutional, including when student participation is not a formal requirement or prayer is silent. See *Wallace*, 472 U. S. 38 (mandatory moment of silence for prayer); *School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203 (1963) (nonmandatory recitation of Bible verses and prayer); *Engel*, 370 U. S., at 424 (nonmandatory recitation of one-sentence prayer). The Court also has held that incorporating a nondenominational general benediction into a graduation ceremony is unconstitutional. *Lee*, 505 U. S. 577. Finally, this Court has held that including prayers in student football games is unconstitutional, even when delivered by students rather than staff and even when students themselves initiated the prayer. *Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe*, 530 U. S. 290 (2000).

## B

Under these precedents, the Establishment Clause violation at hand is clear. This Court has held that a “[s]tate official[] direct[ing] the performance of a formal religious exercise” as a part of the “ceremon[y]” of a school event “conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises for students.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 586–587. Kennedy was on the job as a school official “on government property” when he incorporated a public, demonstrative prayer into “government-sponsored school-related events” as a regularly scheduled feature of those events. *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 302.

Kennedy’s tradition of a 50-yard line prayer thus strikes at the heart of the Establishment Clause’s concerns about

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

endorsement. For students and community members at the game, Coach Kennedy was the face and the voice of the District during football games. The timing and location Kennedy selected for his prayers were “clothed in the traditional indicia of school sporting events.” *Id.*, at 308. Kennedy spoke from the playing field, which was accessible only to students and school employees, not to the general public. Although the football game itself had ended, the football game events had not; Kennedy himself acknowledged that his responsibilities continued until the players went home. Kennedy’s postgame responsibilities were what placed Kennedy on the 50-yard line in the first place; that was, after all, where he met the opposing team to shake hands after the game. Permitting a school coach to lead students and others he invited onto the field in prayer at a predictable time after each game could only be viewed as a postgame tradition occurring “with the approval of the school administration.” *Ibid.*

Kennedy’s prayer practice also implicated the coercion concerns at the center of this Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This Court has previously recognized a heightened potential for coercion where school officials are involved, as their “effort[s] to monitor prayer will be perceived by the students as inducing a participation they might otherwise reject.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 590. The reasons for fearing this pressure are self-evident. This Court has recognized that students face immense social pressure. Students look up to their teachers and coaches as role models and seek their approval. Students also depend on this approval for tangible benefits. Players recognize that gaining the coach’s approval may pay dividends small and large, from extra playing time to a stronger letter of recommendation to additional support in college athletic recruiting. In addition to these pressures to please their coaches, this Court has recognized that players face “immense social pressure” from their peers in the “extracurricular event

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that is American high school football.” *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 311.

The record before the Court bears this out. The District Court found, in the evidentiary record, that some students reported joining Kennedy’s prayer because they felt social pressure to follow their coach and teammates. Kennedy told the District that he began his prayers alone and that players followed each other over time until a majority of the team joined him, an evolution showing coercive pressure at work.

Kennedy does not defend his longstanding practice of leading the team in prayer out loud on the field as they kneeled around him. Instead, he responds, and the Court accepts, that his highly visible and demonstrative prayer at the last three games before his suspension did not violate the Establishment Clause because these prayers were quiet and thus private. This Court’s precedents, however, do not permit isolating government actions from their context in determining whether they violate the Establishment Clause. To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly stated that Establishment Clause inquiries are fact specific and require careful consideration of the origins and practical reality of the specific practice at issue. See, e.g., *id.*, at 315; *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 597. In *Santa Fe*, the Court specifically addressed how to determine whether the implementation of a new policy regarding prayers at football games “insulates the continuation of such prayers from constitutional scrutiny.” 530 U. S., at 315. The Court held that “inquiry into this question not only can, but must, include an examination of the circumstances surrounding” the change in policy, the “long-established tradition” before the change, and the “unique circumstances” of the school in question. *Ibid.* This Court’s precedent thus does not permit treating Kennedy’s “new” prayer practice as occurring on a blank slate, any more than those in the District’s school community would have experienced Kennedy’s changed practice (to the

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

degree there was one) as erasing years of prior actions by Kennedy.

Like the policy change in *Santa Fe*, Kennedy’s “changed” prayers at these last three games were a clear continuation of a “long-established tradition of sanctioning” school official involvement in student prayers. *Ibid.* Students at the three games following Kennedy’s changed practice witnessed Kennedy kneeling at the same time and place where he had led them in prayer for years. They witnessed their peers from opposing teams joining Kennedy, just as they had when Kennedy was leading joint team prayers. They witnessed members of the public and state representatives going onto the field to support Kennedy’s cause and pray with him. Kennedy did nothing to stop this unauthorized access to the field, a clear dereliction of his duties. The BHS players in fact joined the crowd around Kennedy after he stood up from praying at the last game. That BHS students did not join Kennedy in these last three specific prayers did not make those events compliant with the Establishment Clause. The coercion to do so was evident. Kennedy himself apparently anticipated that his continued prayer practice would draw student participation, requesting that the District agree that it would not “interfere” with students joining him in the future. App. 71.

Finally, Kennedy stresses that he never formally required students to join him in his prayers. But existing precedents do not require coercion to be explicit, particularly when children are involved. To the contrary, this Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence establishes that “‘the government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.’” *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 312. Thus, the Court has held that the Establishment Clause “will not permit” a school “‘to exact religious conformity from a student as the price’ of joining her classmates at a varsity football game.” *Ibid.* To uphold a coach’s integration of prayer into the ceremony of

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

a football game, in the context of an established history of the coach inviting student involvement in prayer, is to exact precisely this price from students.

C

As the Court explains, see *ante*, at 15, Kennedy did not “shed [his] constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate” while on duty as a coach. *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.*, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Constitutional rights, however, are not absolutes. Rights often conflict and balancing of interests is often required to protect the separate rights at issue. See *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, 597 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2022) (slip op., at 12) (BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting) (noting that “the presence of countervailing interests . . . is what ma[kes]” a constitutional question “hard, and what require[s] balancing”).

The particular tensions at issue in this case, between the speech interests of the government and its employees and between public institutions’ religious neutrality and private individuals’ religious exercise, are far from novel. This Court’s settled precedents offer guidance to assist courts, governments, and the public in navigating these tensions. Under these precedents, the District’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justified both its time and place restrictions on Kennedy’s speech and his exercise of religion.

First, as to Kennedy’s free speech claim, Kennedy “accept[ed] certain limitations” on his freedom of speech when he accepted government employment. *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006). The Court has recognized that “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions” to ensure “the efficient provision of public services.” *Ibid.* Case law instructs balancing “the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees” to determine whose interests should prevail. *Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.*, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968).

As the Court of Appeals below outlined, the District has a strong argument that Kennedy’s speech, formally integrated into the center of a District event, was speech in his official capacity as an employee that is not entitled to First Amendment protections at all. See *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 418; 991 F. 3d, at 1014–1016 (applying *Garcetti*).<sup>3</sup> It is unnecessary to resolve this question, however, because, even assuming that Kennedy’s speech was in his capacity as a private citizen, the District’s responsibilities under the Establishment Clause provided “adequate justification” for restricting it. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 418.

Similarly, Kennedy’s free exercise claim must be considered in light of the fact that he is a school official and, as such, his participation in religious exercise can create Establishment Clause conflicts. Accordingly, his right to pray at any time and in any manner he wishes while exercising his professional duties is not absolute. See *Lee*, 505 U. S.,

---

<sup>3</sup>The Court’s primary argument that Kennedy’s speech is not in his official capacity is that he was permitted “to call home, check a text, [or] socialize” during the time period in question. *Ante*, at 18–19. These truly private, informal communications bear little resemblance, however, to what Kennedy did. Kennedy explicitly sought to make his demonstrative prayer a permanent ritual of the postgame events, at the physical center of those events, where he was present by virtue of his job responsibilities, and after years of giving prayer-filled motivational speeches to students at the same relative time and location. In addition, Kennedy gathered public officials and other members of the public onto the field to join him in the prayer, contrary to school policies controlling access to the field. Such behavior raises an entirely different risk of depriving the employer of “control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created” than an employee making a call home on the sidelines, fleetingly checking email, or pausing to hug a friend in the crowd. *Garcetti*, 547 U. S., at 422.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at 587 (noting that a school official's choice to integrate a prayer is "attributable to the State"). As the Court explains, see *ante*, at 13–14, the parties agree (and I therefore assume) that for the purposes of Kennedy's claim, the burden is on the District to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedy's public prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah*, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993).

Here, the District's directive prohibiting Kennedy's demonstrative speech at the 50-yard line was narrowly tailored to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. The District's suspension of Kennedy followed a long history. The last three games proved that Kennedy did not intend to pray silently, but to thrust the District into incorporating a religious ceremony into its events, as he invited others to join his prayer and anticipated in his communications with the District that students would want to join as well. Notably, the District repeatedly sought to work with Kennedy to develop an accommodation to permit him to engage in religious exercise during or after his game-related responsibilities. Kennedy, however, ultimately refused to respond to the District's suggestions and declined to communicate with the District, except through media appearances. Because the District's valid Establishment Clause concerns satisfy strict scrutiny, Kennedy's free exercise claim fails as well.

### III

Despite the overwhelming precedents establishing that school officials leading prayer violates the Establishment Clause, the Court today holds that Kennedy's midfield prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause. This decision rests on an erroneous understanding of the Religion Clauses. It also disregards the balance this Court's cases strike among the rights conferred by the Clauses. The Court relies on an assortment of pluralities,

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

concurrences, and dissents by Members of the current majority to effect fundamental changes in this Court's Religion Clauses jurisprudence, all the while proclaiming that nothing has changed at all.

## A

This case involves three Clauses of the First Amendment. As a threshold matter, the Court today proceeds from two mistaken understandings of the way the protections these Clauses embody interact.

First, the Court describes the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses as “work[ing] in tandem” to “provid[e] overlapping protection for expressive religious activities,” leaving religious speech “doubly protect[ed].” *Ante*, at 11. This narrative noticeably (and improperly) sets the Establishment Clause to the side. The Court is correct that certain expressive religious activities may fall within the ambit of both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, but “the First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 591. The First Amendment protects speech “by ensuring its full expression even when the government participates.” *Ibid*. Its “method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse,” however, based on the understanding that “the government is not a prime participant” in “religious debate or expression,” whereas government is the “object of some of our most important speech.” *Ibid*. Thus, as this Court has explained, while the Free Speech Clause has “close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment,” the First Amendment’s protections for religion diverge from those for speech because of the Establishment Clause, which provides a “specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.” *Ibid*. Therefore, while our Constitution “coun-



SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

sel[s] mutual respect and tolerance,” the Constitution’s vision of how to achieve this end does in fact involve some “singl[ing] out” of religious speech by the government. *Ante*, at 1. This is consistent with “the lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 591–592.

Second, the Court contends that the lower courts erred by introducing a false tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See *ante*, at 20–21. The Court, however, has long recognized that these two Clauses, while “express[ing] complementary values,” “often exert conflicting pressures.” *Cutter*, 544 U. S., at 719. See also *Locke v. Davey*, 540 U. S. 712, 718 (2004) (describing the Clauses as “frequently in tension”). The “absolute terms” of the two Clauses mean that they “tend to clash” if “expanded to a logical extreme.” *Walz*, 397 U. S., at 668–669.

The Court inaccurately implies that the courts below relied upon a rule that the Establishment Clause must always “prevail” over the Free Exercise Clause. *Ante*, at 20. In focusing almost exclusively on Kennedy’s free exercise claim, however, and declining to recognize the conflicting rights at issue, the Court substitutes one supposed blanket rule for another. The proper response where tension arises between the two Clauses is not to ignore it, which effectively silently elevates one party’s right above others. The proper response is to identify the tension and balance the interests based on a careful analysis of “whether [the] particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.” *Walz*, 397 U. S., at 669. As discussed above, that inquiry leads to the conclusion that permitting Kennedy’s desired religious practice at the time and place of his choosing, without regard to the legitimate needs of his employer, violates the Establishment Clause in the particular context

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at issue here. *Supra*, at 16–20.

## B

For decades, the Court has recognized that, in determining whether a school has violated the Establishment Clause, “one of the relevant questions is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the [practice], would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.” *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court now says for the first time that endorsement simply does not matter, and completely repudiates the test established in *Lemon*, 403 U. S. 602. *Ante*, at 22–24. Both of these moves are erroneous and, despite the Court’s assurances, novel.

Start with endorsement. The Court reserves particular criticism for the longstanding understanding that government action that appears to endorse religion violates the Establishment Clause, which it describes as an “offshoot” of *Lemon* and paints as a “‘modified heckler’s veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed’” based on “‘‘perceptions’’” or “‘‘discomfort.’’” *Ante*, at 21–22 (quoting *Good News Club v. Milford Central School*, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001)). This is a strawman. Precedent long has recognized that endorsement concerns under the Establishment Clause, properly understood, bear no relation to a “heckler’s veto.” *Ante*, at 22. *Good News Club* itself explained the difference between the two: The endorsement inquiry considers the perspective not of just any hypothetical or uninformed observer experiencing subjective discomfort, but of “‘the reasonable observer’” who is “‘aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious [speech takes place].’” 533 U. S., at 119. That is because “‘the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from . . . discomfort’” but concern “‘with the

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

political community writ large.” *Ibid.* (emphasis deleted).

Given this concern for the political community, it is unsurprising that the Court has long prioritized endorsement concerns in the context of public education. See, e.g., *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 305; *Wallace*, 472 U. S., at 60–61; *Edwards*, 482 U. S., at 578, 593; see also *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 618–619 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that many of the Court’s Establishment Clause holdings in the school context are concerned not with whether the policy in question “coerced students to participate in prayer” but with whether it “convey[ed] a message of state approval of prayer activities in the public schools” (quoting *Wallace*, 472 U. S., at 61)).<sup>4</sup> No subsequent decisions in other contexts, including the cases about monuments and legislative meetings on which the Court relies, have so much as questioned the application of this core Establishment Clause concern in the context of public schools. In fact, *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, 572 U. S. 565, which held a prayer during a town meeting permissible, specifically distinguished *Lee* because *Lee* considered the Establishment Clause in the context of schools. 572 U. S., at 590 (plurality opinion).

Paying heed to these precedents would not “‘purge from the public sphere’ anything an observer could reasonably infer endorses” religion. *Ante*, at 22. To the contrary, the Court has recognized that “there will be instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the public schools and their students.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 598–599. These instances, the Court has said, are “often questions of accommodat[ing]” religious practices to the degree possible while respecting the

---

<sup>4</sup>The Court attempts to recast *Lee* and *Santa Fe* as solely concerning coercion, *ante*, at 29–30, but both cases emphasized that it was important to avoid appearances of “‘state endorsement of prayer in public schools.’” *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 308; see *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 590 (finding that the “degree of school involvement” indicated that the “prayers bore the imprint of the State”).

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Establishment Clause. *Id.*, at 599.<sup>5</sup> In short, the endorsement inquiry dictated by precedent is a measured, practical, and administrable one, designed to account for the competing interests present within any given community.

Despite all of this authority, the Court claims that it “long ago abandoned” both the “endorsement test” and this Court’s decision in *Lemon* 403 U. S. 602. *Ante*, at 22. The Court chiefly cites the plurality opinion in *American Legion v. American Humanist Assn.*, 588 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2019) to support this contention. That plurality opinion, to be sure, criticized *Lemon*’s effort at establishing a “grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause” as poorly suited to the broad “array” of diverse establishment claims. 588 U. S., at \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (slip op., at 13, 24). All the Court in *American Legion* ultimately held, however, was that application of the *Lemon* test to “longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices” was ill-advised for reasons specific to those contexts. 588 U. S., at \_\_\_ (slip op., at 16); see also *id.*, at \_\_\_–\_\_\_ (slip op., at 16–21) (discussing at some length why the *Lemon* test was a poor fit for those circumstances). The only categorical rejection of *Lemon* in *American Legion* appeared in separate writings. See 588 U. S., at \_\_\_ (slip op., at 1) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring); *id.*, at \_\_\_ (slip op., at 6)

---

<sup>5</sup>The notion that integration of religious practices into the workplace may require compromise and accommodation is not unique to the public-employer context where Establishment Clause concerns arise. The Court’s precedents on religious discrimination claims similarly recognize that the employment context requires balancing employer and employee interests, and that religious practice need not always be accommodated. See *Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.*, 586 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2019) (slip op., at 6) (ALITO, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that “Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion does not require an employer to make any accommodation that imposes more than a *de minimis* burden”). Surely, an employee’s religious practice that forces a school district to engage in burdensome measures to stop spectators from rushing onto a field and knocking people down imposes much more than a *de minimis* burden.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); *id.*, at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 7) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment); see *ante*, at 23, n. 4.<sup>6</sup>

The Court now goes much further, overruling *Lemon* entirely and in all contexts. It is wrong to do so. *Lemon* summarized “the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years” of experience “draw[ing] lines” as to when government engagement with religion violated the Establishment Clause. 403 U. S., at 612. *Lemon* properly concluded that precedent generally directed consideration of whether the government action had a “secular legislative purpose,” whether its “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and whether in practice it “foster[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” *Id.*, at 612–613. It is true “that rigid application of the *Lemon* test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem,” but that does not mean that the test has no value. *American Legion*, 588 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 1) (KAGAN, J., concurring in part).

To put it plainly, the purposes and effects of a government action matter in evaluating whether that action violates the Establishment Clause, as numerous precedents beyond *Lemon* instruct in the particular context of public schools. See *supra*, at 14–16, 18. Neither the critiques of *Lemon* as setting out a dispositive test for all seasons nor

---

<sup>6</sup>The Court also cites *Shurtleff v. Boston*, 596 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2022), as evidence that the *Lemon* test has been rejected. See *ante*, at 23. Again, while separate writings in *Shurtleff* criticized *Lemon*, the Court did not. The opinion of the Court simply applied the longstanding rule that, when the government does not speak for itself, it cannot exclude speech based on the speech’s “religious viewpoint.” *Shurtleff*, 596 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 12) (quoting *Good News Club*, 533 U. S., at 112). The Court further infers *Lemon*’s implicit overruling from recent decisions that do not apply its test. See *ante*, at 23, n. 4. As explained above, however, not applying a test in a given case is a different matter from overruling it entirely and, moreover, the Court has never before questioned the relevance of endorsement in the school-prayer context.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the fact that the Court has not referred to *Lemon* in all situations support this Court’s decision to dismiss that precedent entirely, particularly in the school context.

## C

Upon overruling one “grand unified theory,” the Court introduces another: It holds that courts must interpret whether an Establishment Clause violation has occurred mainly “by ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” *Ante*, at 23 (quoting *Town of Greece*, 572 U. S., at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here again, the Court professes that nothing has changed. In fact, while the Court has long referred to historical practice as one element of the analysis in specific Establishment Clause cases, the Court has never announced this as a general test or exclusive focus. *American Legion*, 588 U. S., at \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (BREYER, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3) (noting that the Court was “appropriately ‘look[ing] to history for guidance’” but was not “adopt[ing] a ‘history and tradition test’”).

The Court reserves any meaningful explanation of its history-and-tradition test for another day, content for now to disguise it as established law and move on. It should not escape notice, however, that the effects of the majority’s new rule could be profound. The problems with elevating history and tradition over purpose and precedent are well documented. See *Dobbs*, 597 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 16) (explaining that the Framers “defined rights in general terms to permit future evolution in their scope and meaning”); *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (2022) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 24–28) (explaining the pitfalls of a “near-exclusive reliance on history” and offering examples of when this Court has “misread” history in the past); *Brown v. Davenport*, 596 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_\_–\_\_\_\_ (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

7–8) (noting the inaccuracies risked when courts “play amateur historian”).

For now, it suffices to say that the Court’s history-and-tradition test offers essentially no guidance for school administrators. If even judges and Justices, with full adversarial briefing and argument tailored to precise legal issues, regularly disagree (and err) in their amateur efforts at history, how are school administrators, faculty, and staff supposed to adapt? How will school administrators exercise their responsibilities to manage school curriculum and events when the Court appears to elevate individuals’ rights to religious exercise above all else? Today’s opinion provides little in the way of answers; the Court simply sets the stage for future legal changes that will inevitably follow the Court’s choice today to upset longstanding rules.

#### D

Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from coercing people to engage in religion practice, *ante*, at 24–25, but its analysis of coercion misconstrues both the record and this Court’s precedents.

The Court claims that the District “never raised coercion concerns” simply because the District conceded that there was “‘no evidence that students [were] *directly* coerced to pray with Kennedy.’” *Ante*, at 25 (emphasis added). The Court’s suggestion that coercion must be “direc[t]” to be cognizable under the Establishment Clause is contrary to long-established precedent. The Court repeatedly has recognized that indirect coercion may raise serious establishment concerns, and that “there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.” *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 592 (opinion of the Court); see also *supra*, at 15–16. Tellingly, *none* of this Court’s major cases involving school prayer concerned school practices that required

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

students to do any more than listen silently to prayers, and some did not even formally require students to listen, instead providing that attendance was not mandatory. See *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 296–298; *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 593; *Wallace*, 472 U. S., at 40; *School Dist. of Abington Township*, 374 U. S., at 205; *Engel*, 370 U. S., at 422. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the practices were coercive as a constitutional matter.

Today’s Court quotes the *Lee* Court’s remark that enduring others’ speech is “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.” *Ante*, at 26 (quoting *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 590). The *Lee* Court, however, expressly concluded, in the very same paragraph, that “[t]his argument cannot prevail” in the school-prayer context because the notion that being subject to a “brief” prayer in school is acceptable “overlooks a fundamental dynamic of the Constitution”: its “specific prohibition on . . . state intervention in religious affairs.” *Id.*, at 591; see also *id.*, at 594 (“[T]he government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means”).<sup>7</sup>

The Court also distinguishes *Santa Fe* because Kennedy’s prayers “were not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience.” *Ante*, at 30. This misses the point. In *Santa Fe*, a student council chaplain delivered a prayer over the public-address system before each varsity football game of the season. 530 U. S., at 294. Students were not required as a general matter to attend the games, but “cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, the team members

---

<sup>7</sup>The Court further claims that *Lee* is distinguishable because it involved prayer at an event in which the school had “in every practical sense compelled attendance and participation in [a] religious exercise.” *Ante*, at 29 (quoting *Lee*, 505 U. S., at 598). The Court in *Lee*, however, recognized expressly that attendance at the graduation ceremony was not mandatory and that students who attended only had to remain silent during and after the prayers. *Id.*, at 583, 593.



SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

themselves” were, and the Court would have found an “improper effect of coercing those present” even if it “regard[ed] every high school student’s decision to attend . . . as purely voluntary.” *Id.*, at 311–312. Kennedy’s prayers raise precisely the same concerns. His prayers did not need to be broadcast. His actions spoke louder than his words. His prayers were intentionally, visually demonstrative to an audience aware of their history and no less captive than the audience in *Santa Fe*, with spectators watching and some players perhaps engaged in a song, but all waiting to rejoin their coach for a postgame talk. Moreover, Kennedy’s prayers had a greater coercive potential because they were delivered not by a student, but by their coach, who was still on active duty for postgame events.

In addition, despite the direct record evidence that students felt coerced to participate in Kennedy’s prayers, the Court nonetheless concludes that coercion was not present in any event because “Kennedy did not seek to direct any prayers to students or require anyone else to participate.” *Ante*, at 26; see also *ante*, at 30, n. 7 (contending that the fact that “students might choose, unprompted, to participate” in their coach’s on-the-field prayers does not “necessarily prove them coercive”). But nowhere does the Court engage with the unique coercive power of a coach’s actions on his adolescent players.<sup>8</sup>

In any event, the Court makes this assertion only by drawing a bright line between Kennedy’s yearslong practice of leading student prayers, which the Court does not de-

---

<sup>8</sup>Puzzlingly, the Court goes a step further and suggests that Kennedy may have been in violation of the District policy on Religious-Related Activities and Practices if he did not permit the players to join his prayers because the policy prohibited staff from “discourag[ing]” student prayer. *Ante*, at 4, 30, n. 7. The policy, however, specifically referred to student prayer of the student’s “own volition” and equally prohibited staff from “encourag[ing]” student prayer. App. 28.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

fend, and Kennedy’s final three prayers, which BHS students did not join, but student peers from the other teams did. See *ante*, at 26 (distinguishing Kennedy’s prior practice and focusing narrowly on “three prayers . . . in October 2015”). As discussed above, see *supra*, at 18, this mode of analysis contravenes precedent by “turn[ing] a blind eye to the context in which [Kennedy’s practice] arose,” *Santa Fe*, 530 U. S., at 315.<sup>9</sup> This Court’s precedents require a more nuanced inquiry into the realities of coercion in the specific school context concerned than the majority recognizes today. The question before the Court is not whether a coach taking a knee to pray on the field would constitute an Establishment Clause violation in any and all circumstances. It is whether permitting Kennedy to continue a demonstrative prayer practice at the center of the football field after years of inappropriately leading students in prayer in the same spot, at that same time, and in the same manner, which led students to feel compelled to join him, violates the Establishment Clause. It does.

Having disregarded this context, the Court finds Kennedy’s three-game practice distinguishable from precedent

---

<sup>9</sup>The Court claims that Kennedy’s “past prayer practices” should not be seen to “taint” his current ones by again turning to *Town of Greece v. Galloway*, the town assembly prayer case. *Ante*, at 30, n. 7. In the passage the Court cites, *Town of Greece* concluded that “two remarks” by two different “guest minister[s]” on two isolated occasions did not constitute a “pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose.” 572 U. S., at 585. As *Town of Greece* itself emphasizes, the school context presents Establishment Clause concerns distinct from those raised in a town meeting for “mature adults.” *Id.*, at 590 (plurality opinion). See *supra*, at 15. In any event, Kennedy’s yearslong “past prayer practices” constituted an established pattern, not an isolated occasion, and he hardly “abandoned” the practice. *Ante*, at 30, n. 7. As his October 14 letter and subsequent actions made clear, Kennedy attempted to hew as closely to his past practice as possible, taking a knee at the same time and place as previously, and in the same manner that initially drew students to join him and by improperly permitting spectators to join him on the field.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

because the prayers were “quie[t]” and the students were otherwise “occupied.” *Ante*, at 26. The record contradicts this narrative. Even on the Court’s myopic framing of the facts, at two of the three games on which the Court focuses, players witnessed student peers from the other team and other authority figures surrounding Kennedy and joining him in prayer. The coercive pressures inherent in such a situation are obvious. Moreover, Kennedy’s actual demand to the District was that he give “verbal” prayers specifically at the midfield position where he traditionally led team prayers, and that students be allowed to join him “voluntarily” and pray. App. 64, 69–71. Notably, the Court today does not embrace this demand, but it nonetheless rejects the District’s right to ensure that students were not pressured to pray.

To reiterate, the District did not argue, and neither court below held, that “*any* visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed . . . impermissibly coercive on students.” *Ante*, at 28. Nor has anyone contended that a coach may never visibly pray on the field. The courts below simply recognized that Kennedy continued to initiate prayers visible to students, while still on duty during school events, under the exact same circumstances as his past practice of leading student prayer. It is unprecedented for the Court to hold that this conduct, taken as a whole, did not raise cognizable coercion concerns. Importantly, nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as calling into question that Kennedy’s conduct may have raised other concerns regarding disruption of school events or misuse of school facilities that would have separately justified employment action against Kennedy.

\* \* \*

The Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are equally integral in protecting religious freedom in our society. The first serves as “a promise from our government,”

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

while the second erects a “backstop that disables our government from breaking it” and “start[ing] us down the path to the past, when [the right to free exercise] was routinely abridged.” *Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer*, 582 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2017) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 26).

Today, the Court once again weakens the backstop. It elevates one individual’s interest in personal religious exercise, in the exact time and place of that individual’s choosing, over society’s interest in protecting the separation between church and state, eroding the protections for religious liberty for all. Today’s decision is particularly misguided because it elevates the religious rights of a school official, who voluntarily accepted public employment and the limits that public employment entails, over those of his students, who are required to attend school and who this Court has long recognized are particularly vulnerable and deserving of protection. In doing so, the Court sets us further down a perilous path in forcing States to entangle themselves with religion, with all of our rights hanging in the balance. As much as the Court protests otherwise, today’s decision is no victory for religious liberty. I respectfully dissent.